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Opening the Gate to Money Market Fund 
Reform 
 
Hester Peirce and Robert Greene
*
 
 
Over the last several years, the roughly $2.7 trillion money-market 
fund (“MMF”) industry1 has found itself the uncomfortable object of 
attention from regulators and academics.  One of these funds—the 
Reserve Primary Fund—notoriously could not pay investors during the 
crisis, a virtually unprecedented event in the stable world of money 
market funds. A run on certain MMFs ensued, and the government set up 
a number of programs to prop up MMFs and the entities that rely on 
them for funding.  Although the focus on MMFs and the potential 
instability brought to light by the last crisis is warranted, the nature of the 
reforms being considered is not. In this article, we propose an alternative 
reform that centers on MMF boards, rather than regulators, to make 
critical decisions on behalf of the fund during times of crisis. 
Specifically, we propose that MMF boards of directors be permitted to 
gate redemptions at the board’s sole discretion for any length of time 
without any conditions other than an affirmative board vote, including a 
vote of the majority of the fund’s disinterested directors, that suspending 
redemptions is in the best interests of the fund and is necessary to protect 
the fund’s stable net asset value and to ensure the equitable treatment of 
fund shareholders.  This proposal is a natural extension of the existing 
responsibilities of MMF boards of directors. 
A MMF is a mutual fund—a collectively owned pool of assets—
that typically invests in low-risk securities, such as high-grade 
commercial paper, government securities, and certificates of deposit.  
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulates MMFs under 
the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“Investment Company Act” or 
 
*Hester Peirce is a Senior Research Fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason 
University.  Robert Greene is a master in Public Policy student at Harvard University’s 
John F. Kennedy School of Government.  He formerly was the project coordinator for the 
Regulatory Studies Program and Financial Markets Working Group at the Mercatus 
Center at George Mason University.  We are grateful to Ted Bolema and two anonymous 
peer reviewers for their assistance with this project. 
1. At the end of 2012, total net MMF assets equaled $2,693,523.  See INV. CO. 
INST., 2013 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 178 (53rd ed. 2013), available at 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/2013_factbook.pdf [hereinafter INV. CO. FACT BOOK]. 
1
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“Act”).2  MMF shares generally are bought and sold at one dollar per 
share.  This feature, together with the ease with which shares can be 
bought and sold, makes MMFs serve as the functional equivalent of a 
bank account in the eyes of many investors.  MMFs are an important 
cash management tool for corporate treasurers and a vital source of 
short-term funding for banks, municipalities, and corporations.  MMFs 
cater to both institutional and retail investors and come in several 
different forms: government MMFs, which invest in Treasury securities 
and agency securities; prime MMFs, which invest government securities 
and in other short-term securities such as commercial paper; and tax-
exempt MMFs, which invest in municipal securities. 
The SEC adopted reforms to the regulation of MMFs in 2010 that 
the agency viewed as a first step towards revamping MMF regulation in 
response to the crisis.  The reforms being considered for the second step 
have been the subject of heated debate by industry, regulators, MMF 
investors, and academics.  Many of the suggested reforms are 
unworkable or threaten the core of the industry.  This article argues for a 
more measured reform that offers the promise of addressing the issues 
that we witnessed during 2008 without eliminating a useful investment 
and funding mechanism. 
Our proposal relies on MMF boards to freeze redemptions 
whenever and for as long they determine is in the best interests of the 
fund.  This approach would entrust boards with a responsibility that is 
consistent with other responsibilities they exercise, would serve as a 
stark reminder to MMF investors that they are not equivalent to bank 
accounts, and would give MMF advisers, boards, and investors an 
incentive to limit MMF risk-taking in order to safeguard ready 
redeemability. 
This article proceeds as follows.  Part I outlines briefly the 
background of MMFs.  Part II discusses the role of the board of directors 
in governing MMFs, a role upon which our proposal would build.  Part 
III discusses MMF-related events during the financial crisis of 2007-
2008 and describes the government’s response to these events. Part IV 
describes the reforms the SEC instituted in 2010.  Part V outlines options 
for further reform.  Part VI outlines and discusses benefits and 
drawbacks of our proposed solution—unrestricted discretionary gating 
by fund boards. Part VII concludes. 
 
 
2. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2012). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/4
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I. Competitive and Regulatory Origins of Money Market Funds 
 
The history of MMFs is rooted in competition with bank accounts.  
The regulatory framework that the SEC built up around MMFs allowed 
them to thrive and become a large and important segment of the financial 
landscape. 
 
A. How Money-Market Funds Began 
 
MMFs arose as a response to investor frustration over federally 
imposed interest rate caps on bank savings accounts. In 1933, the Federal 
Reserve implemented Regulation Q, which capped the level of interest a 
bank could offer on savings accounts.  When interest rates rose in the 
early 1970s, savings accounts became increasingly unattractive.
3
 The 
original purpose of these caps was to curb purportedly excessive rate 
competition between banks that could lead to more bank risk-taking and 
thus more bank failures.
4
 It was not until the 1960s and 1970s, when 
banks’ competition for deposits increased and interest rates rose above 
the regulatory cap, that the regulatory cap had a noticeable effect.
5
 
MMFs, which were not bound by the caps and thus better able to 
satisfy investor demand for yield, got their start in the 1970s and really 
started growing in the early 1980s.
6
  MMFs offered higher interest rates 
along with the same ready liquidity and one dollar in/one dollar out 
feature as bank accounts.
7
 
 
3. See Timothy Q. Cook, Regulation Q and the Behavior of Savings and Small Time 
Deposits at Commercial Banks and the Thrift Institutions, 64 FED. RES. BANK RICHMOND 
ECON. REV. 14, 24-25 (1978), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2118208. 
4. See id. at 14. 
5. See id. at 14-15.  The rate cap was raised several times during these years.  See 
id. at 14-16. 
6. See SEC Historical Society, Developments in the Mutual Fund Industry – Money 
Market Funds, Edited Transcript 1 (Mar. 29, 2005) (statement of David Silver) 
(explaining that “money market funds had actually first started in 1974, but by 1980, they 
had reached only about $60 or $70 billion.  However, the spur of the high interest rates 
was a tremendous push, and in the year 1981 over $100 billion was added to money 
market funds.”), available at http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-
5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/programs/Transcri
pt_2005_0329_DMFIMMF.pdf.  See also Viktoria Baklanova, Money Market Funds: An 
Introduction to the Literature 10 (Univ. of Westminster L. Sch., Working Paper, 2010) 
(providing a chart of MMF growth), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1542983. 
7. For a description of the growth in MMFs during this era, see Timothy Q. Cook & 
3
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B. Pre-2010 Regulation of Money-Market Funds 
 
MMFs went through a regulatory odyssey at the SEC that ultimately 
resulted in the promulgation of rule 2a-7 in 1983.
8
  Rule 2a-7 allows 
MMFs to maintain a stable net asset value (“NAV”)—the one dollar per 
share value that is a fundamental feature of most MMFs—as long as the 
actual value of fund shares remains within a narrow band around one 
dollar and the rule’s parameters with respect to portfolio maturity, 
quality, liquidity, and diversity are satisfied.
9
  The version of rule 2a-7 
that was in force in 2008 limited MMFs’ average portfolio maturity to 
ninety days and generally prohibited investments in securities with 
maturities longer than 397 days.
10
 MMFs could invest in eligible U.S. 
dollar-denominated securities deemed by the board—based on a 
consideration of credit quality and credit ratings—to “present minimal 
credit risks.”11 Eligible securities were generally either first- or second-
tier rated securities, meaning they had to have one of the two highest 
short-term debt ratings from two different government-approved credit 
rating agencies,
12
 or, if unrated, had to be of comparable quality as 
 
Jeremy G. Duffield, Money Market Mutual Funds and Other Short-Term Investment 
Pools, in INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET 156-172 (Timothy Q. Cook & Robert K. 
Laroche eds., The Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond 1993), available at 
http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/special_reports/instruments_of_the_m
oney_market/pdf/full_publication.pdf.  See also Kenneth T. Rosen & Larry Katz, Money 
Market Mutual Funds: An Experiment in Ad Hoc Financial Deregulation: A Note, 38 J. 
FIN. 1011, 1016 (arguing that “ad hoc deregulation of the financial markets has led to a 
major and probably unnecessary distortion of credit flows.  Money market funds have, 
for the most part, attracted funds from the regulated financial sector and merely recycled 
them back to the commercial lending system”). 
8. See Valuation of Debt Instruments and Computation of Current Price Per Share 
by Certain Open-End Investment Companies (Money Market Funds), 48 Fed. Reg. 
32,555, 32,558 (July 18, 1983) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270).  For a discussion of 
the regulatory history of MMFs, see INV. CO. INST., REPORT OF THE MONEY MARKET 
WORKING GROUP 141-166 (2009) [hereinafter INV. CO. INST., REPORT OF THE MONEY 
MKT. WORKING GRP.], available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_09_mmwg.pdf. 
9. Id. 
10. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2008). 
11. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(c)(3). 
12. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (a)(21) (requiring that MMFs use two government-
approved credit rating agencies, unless only one credit rating agency had rated a security 
at the time it was acquired by the fund).  Government-approved rating agencies – so-
called Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (“NRSROs”) – have been 
the subject of considerable controversy in recent years.  The industry has come under 
attack for its oligopolistic structure, its compensation scheme, and its poor performance 
with respect to rating asset-backed securities during the last crisis.  The SEC has also 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/4
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determined by the MMF’s board.13 MMFs were prohibited from 
investing more than five percent of total assets in first tier securities from 
a single issuer.
14
 MMFs were prohibited from investing more than one 
percent of total assets (or $1 million, whichever was greater) in second 
tier securities of a single issuer.
15
 Total second tier securities could not 
exceed five percent of a fund’s total assets.16 
The SEC designed and updated these restrictions to ensure that a 
stable NAV of one dollar would be easily maintainable
17
 even in the face 
of a negative exogenous shock.
18
 The MMF’s board of directors is 
responsible for seeing that the rule’s restrictions are adhered to and, in 
the event of a significant deviation from a one dollar NAV, rule 2a-7 
requires the board to determine “what action, if any should be 
initiated.”19 Accordingly, we turn next to the role of the MMF board. 
 
II. Role of Mutual Funds’ Boards of Directors 
 
been faulted for its opaque approval process for, and poor oversight of, NRSROs.  For a 
discussion of NRSROs, see, e.g., Mark Calabria & Emily McClintock Elkins, Regulation, 
Market Structure, and Role of Credit Rating Agencies, 704 CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS 
(2012); Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down 
for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619 (1999); Lawrence J. White, The 
Credit Rating Agencies, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 211 (2010); Lawrence J. White, An 
Assessment of the Credit Rating Agencies: Background, Analysis, and Policy (Mercatus 
Ctr. at Geo. Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 13-16, 2013) [hereinafter White, An 
Assessment of the Credit Rating Agencies]. 
13. For the regulatory definition of an eligible security at the time, see 17 C.F.R. § 
270.2a-7(a)(10) (2008). 
14. Id. (c)(4)(i)(A). This condition did not apply to government securities, and the 
cap was twenty-five percent for the first three business days after acquisition. Id. 
15. § 270.2a-7(c)(4)(i)(C). 
16. § 270.2a-7(c)(3)(ii)(A). 
17. The SEC’s original adopting release for rule 2a-7 states that limitations on the 
permissible portfolio investments of money market funds will “provide a greater 
assurance that the money market fund will continue to be able to maintain a stable price 
per share that fairly reflects the current net asset value per share of the fund.” See 
Valuation of Debt Instruments and Computation of Current Price Per Share by Certain 
Open-End Investment Companies (Money Market Funds), Investment Company Act 
Release No. 13,380, 48 Fed. Reg. 32,555, 32,558 (July 18, 1983). 
18. The SEC, for example, tightened the rule 2a-7 requirements in 1991 after 
several MMFs’ advisers stepped in to buy commercial paper from MMFs after issuer 
defaults.  See Revisions to Rules Regulating Money Market Funds, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 18,005, 56 Fed. Reg. 8113, 8115 (Feb. 27, 1991) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 270) (explaining that “the Commission decided to reexamine the conditions 
contained in rule 2a-7 in light of developments in the commercial paper market since the 
rule was adopted.”) (footnote omitted). 
19. § 270.2a-7(c)(7)(ii)(B). 
5
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MMFs, like other mutual funds, are investment companies regulated 
under the Investment Company Act of 1940.
20  
Mutual funds are 
organized as business trusts or corporations under state law,
21
 and 
investors in the fund are shareholders.  They elect a board of directors.
22
  
The role of a fund’s board is important, as is the role of the board of an 
operating company with direct employees.  Fund boards, however, have 
a unique set of responsibilities that derives from the distinct manner in 
which funds are established and managed.  As the discussion below 
illustrates, our proposal—which makes the board responsible in times of 
crisis for protecting the fund from runs—builds upon a long tradition of 
entrusting fund boards with key fund responsibilities. A separate 
company—a fund sponsor—sets up a mutual fund typically as part of a 
diverse, multi-fund complex, usually serves as the principal investment 
adviser to the fund, and may also provide “back-office” administrative 
functions.  Although a distinct legal entity,
23
 the fund is inextricably 
linked with the sponsor—both practically and in the minds of investors—
after it is established.
24
  Separate entities—which may be affiliates of the 
fund sponsor—perform other core day-to-day responsibilities of running 
the fund.  For example, underwriters manage the distribution of fund 
shares, and transfer agents perform recordkeeping functions.
25
  Funds 
 
20. The terms “mutual fund” and “investment company” will be used 
interchangeably herein to refer to open-end SEC-registered investment companies, which 
are mutual funds that “stand[ ] ready to redeem (buy back) its shares from investors.”  
INV. CO. FACT BOOK, supra note 1, at 236.  The shares of closed-end funds, by contrast, 
are traded on an exchange at market prices.  Id. at 230.  MMFs are open-end funds. 
21. See id. at 207.  Approximately ninety percent of mutual funds are organized in 
Massachusetts, Maryland, or Delaware.  See id. at 207 Figure A.1. 
22. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16(a) (2012) 
(generally requiring that directors be elected by shareholders).  In this article, the term 
“directors” is used to encompass both directors of funds organized as corporations and 
trustees of funds organized as business trusts. 
23. See, e.g., Janus Capital Grp. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2304 
(2011) (upholding the legal distinction between a fund and its investment adviser in the 
context of a question of whether the adviser is liable for a purportedly false statement in 
the fund prospectus). 
24. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 4901 (1969) (“Since a typical fund is organized 
by its investment adviser which provides it with almost all management services and 
because its shares are bought by investors who rely on that service, a mutual fund cannot, 
as a practical matter sever its relationship with the adviser.  Therefore, the forces of 
arm’s-length bargaining do not work in the mutual fund industry in the same manner as 
they do in other sectors of the American economy.”). 
25. For a description of fund organization and these functions, see INV. CO. FACT 
BOOK, supra note 1, at 207-210. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/4
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typically enter into a custody agreement with a bank to safeguard fund 
assets and perform related functions.
26
  Given that the funds within a 
complex are often served by the same entities, it is common for all the 
funds in a complex to share a single board.
27
 
The board plays an important role in overseeing the fund’s 
relationship with the sponsor and other service providers.  Boards are 
responsible for “performance evaluation, contract approval, fee approval, 
pricing of fund shares, and oversight of portfolio management and 
compliance issues.”28  They monitor portfolio liquidity and credit quality 
(for MMFs).
29
  When the board delegates the day-to-day legwork to the 
fund’s investment adviser, the board retains oversight responsibility.30  
For example, most fund boards delegate the voting of proxies for 
portfolio securities to the fund’s adviser.31  The board thus “ensure[s] 
 
26. INV. CO. INST., REPORT OF THE MONEY MKT. WORKING GRP., supra note 8, at 34. 
27. See INV. CO. INST. & IND. DIRS. COUNCIL, OVERVIEW OF FUND GOVERNANCE 
PRACTICES, 1994-2010 5 (2011) (reporting that more than eighty percent of participating 
funds had a “unitary board structure,” in which all funds in the complex shared the same 
board and that some larger fund complexes instead employed a cluster board structure), 
available at http://www.idc.org/pdf/pub_11_fund_governance.pdf.  As of 2010, the 
average independent director served on the board for forty-nine mutual funds.  Id. at 4. 
28. JOHN J. BRENNAN, ET AL., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP ON BEST PRACTICES 
FOR FUND DIRECTORS: ENHANCING A CULTURE OF INDEPENDENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS 14 
(1999), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_best_practices.pdf; see Jones v. Harris 
Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 351 (2010) (explaining that reviewing courts should defer to 
the board’s assessment in approving advisory fees as long as the board’s process was 
thorough and well-informed).  See infra Table I for a list of specific board responsibilities 
under the Investment Company Act and SEC regulations. 
29. See, e.g., INV. CO. INST., UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF MUTUAL FUND 
DIRECTORS 13 (Inv. Co. Inst., Investor Awareness Series, 1999), available at 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/bro_mf_directors.pdf. 
30. See, e.g., Changes to Method of Determining Holding Period of Restricted 
Securities Under Rules 144 and 145,  Investment Company Act Release No. 17,452, 55 
Fed. Reg. 17,933, 17,940 n.61 (Apr. 30, 1990) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200 & 
230) (“The Commission believes that the ultimate responsibility for liquidity 
determinations is that of the board of directors.  However, the board may delegate the 
day-to-day function of determining the liquidity of securities to the fund’s investment 
adviser, provided that the board retains sufficient oversight.”). 
31. See MUTUAL FUND DIRS. FORUM, PRACTICAL GUIDANCE FOR FUND DIRECTORS 
ON OVERSIGHT OF PROXY VOTING 3 (2012) (explaining that “the majority of Boards 
delegate some or all voting power to an adviser”), available at 
http://www.mfdf.org/images/uploads/newsroom/Oversight_of_Proxy_Voting.pdf; INV. 
CO. INST. & IND. DIRS. COUNCIL, OVERSIGHT OF FUND PROXY VOTING 1 (2008) (“A fund’s 
board of directors typically delegates decisions about the voting of portfolio company 
proxies to the fund’s investment adviser, in recognition that proxy voting is part of the 
investment advisory process.  This delegation is subject to the board’s continuing 
oversight.”), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_08_proxy_voting.pdf. 
7
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that the fund’s shareholders receive the benefits and services to which 
they are fairly entitled, both as a matter of law and in accordance with 
the fund’s prospectus . . . .”32 
Under the Investment Company Act, independent directors play a 
particularly important role in policing conflicts of interest.
33
  The Act 
requires that at least forty percent of the board’s directors be 
independent.
34
 Independent directors cannot be “interested persons,” 
meaning persons affiliated with the fund or fund service providers.
35
  At 
the end of 2011, approximately ninety percent of fund complexes had 
boards with seventy-five percent independent directors, well above the 
statutory minimum.
36
 
Fund directors’ responsibilities are governed by the state 
corporation law and the more tailored requirements prescribed by the 
Investment Company Act and the SEC’s implementing regulations.  
Under state law duties of care and loyalty, directors must “act in good 
faith and with that degree of diligence, care and skill that a person of 
ordinary prudence would exercise under similar circumstances in a like 
position,” and “exercise their powers in the interests of the fund and not 
in the directors’ own interests or in the interests of another person or 
organization.”37 Specific state law obligations include providing 
 
32. BRENNAN, supra note 28, at ii. 
33. See, e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 484 (1979) (explaining that Congress 
chose to rely on independent directors as an independent check on mutual funds “in 
preference to the more direct controls on behavior”); Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 
402, 406 (1977) (independent directors should act “in the role of ‘independent 
watchdogs’ who would assure that, in accordance with the preamble of the Investment 
Company Act, mutual funds would operate in the interest of all classes of their securities 
holders, rather than for the benefit of investment advisers, directors, or other special 
groups”); see also Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 26520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,380 (Aug. 2, 2004) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. pt. 
270) (“Fund independent directors play a central role in policing the conflicts of interest 
that advisers inevitably have with the funds they advise.”). 
34. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 10(a), 15 U.S.C. §80a-10(a) (2012). 
35. For the statutory definition of an “interested person,” see Investment Company 
Act of 1940 § 2(a)(19), 15 U.S.C. §80a-2(a)(19) (2012). 
36. INV. CO. FACT BOOK, supra note 1, at 220. 
37. Interpretive Matters Concerning Independent Directors of Investment 
Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,083, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,877, 59,878 
(Nov. 3, 1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 271) (citing Hanson Trust PLC v. ML 
SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir. 1986); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace 
Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984); and 11 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., 3A 
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1029 (perm. ed.)); see 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (2008) (setting forth the standards of conduct for 
directors); DIV. INV. MGMT., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PROTECTING INVESTORS: A HALF 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/4
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“management direction” to the fund, approving major transactions, and 
monitoring conflicts of interest.
38
  In court challenges, directors are 
protected by the business judgment rule “so long as the directors acted in 
good faith, were reasonably informed, and rationally believed that the 
action taken was in the best interests of the fund.”39  The Investment 
Company Act authorizes the SEC to sue directors for “engag[ing] in any 
act or practice constituting a breach of fiduciary duty involving personal 
misconduct . . . .”40 
The Investment Company Act and SEC implementing regulations 
give mutual fund boards additional responsibilities. SEC rules entrust 
MMF boards with an additional unique set of duties.
41
  The responsibility 
that we propose to add—determining when gating is appropriate—would 
be a logical extension of the current board duties set forth in these two 
tables. The first table details mutual fund board responsibilities and the 
second details responsibilities unique to MMFs under rule 2a-7. As these 
 
CENTURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION, at 255 n.10 (1992) [hereinafter 
PROTECTING INVESTORS] (explaining state law duties of care and loyalty), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/icreg50-92.pdf; 1 THOMAS P. LEMKE, 
GERALD T. LINS & A. THOMAS SMITH III, REGULATION OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES § 9.09 
(2013) (explaining that “[t]he duty of loyalty requires that directors act in the fund’s 
interest—not their own interests or those of persons or entities”); FED. REG. OF SEC. 
COMM., A.B.A., FUND DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK 98 (3d ed. 2006) (“The duties of directors 
under state law are characterized as a duty of loyalty and a duty of care.  The duty of 
loyalty requires a director to exercise his or her powers in the interests of the fund and not 
in the director’s own interest or in the interest of another person or organization.”); ICI 
MUT. INS. CO., INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR LITIGATION RISK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
UNDERSTANDING AND REDUCING RISK TO FUND INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN CIVIL 
LITIGATION app. A, at A-1 (2006) (explaining that, “directors owe a duty to protect the 
interests of their fund and neither pursue interests of their own that are contrary to the 
interests of the fund nor place their own interests ahead of the interests of the fund”), 
available at http://www.idc.org/pdf/icim_litigation_risk.pdf. 
38. PROTECTING INVESTORS, supra note 37, at 255 n.10. 
39. Interpretive Matters Concerning Independent Directors of Investment 
Companies, 64 Fed. Reg. at 59,878 n.13 (citing Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098 
(Del. Ch. 1999) and 11 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., 3A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF 
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1036 (perm. ed.)); see also FED. REG. OF SEC. 
COMM., supra note 37, at 100 (explaining that the business judgment rule is “a standard 
of judicial review used in analyzing director conduct to determine whether a board 
decision can be successfully challenged or a director should be held personally liable”). 
40. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (2012). 
41. As long as they employ written guidelines and oversight, MMF boards are 
permitted to delegate many of their tasks to the investment adviser, but remain ultimately 
responsible.  17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(e) (2013) (providing that “[t]he money market fund’s 
board of directors may delegate to the fund’s investment adviser or officers the 
responsibility to make any determination required to be made by the board of directors . . 
. .” excluding certain enumerated responsibilities). 
9
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tables illustrate, boards make most key decisions for funds. Our proposal, 
which is described in Part VI, would enable them to make another key 
decision. 
 
TABLE I: Select Responsibilities Unique to a Mutual Fund Board of 
Directors
42
 
Board Responsibility 
Relevant Statute 
(2012) or 
Regulation (2013) 
Determine fair value of securities for which market 
values are not readily available 
15 U.S.C. § 80a-
2(a)(41) & 17 C.F.R. 
§ 270.2a-4(a)(1) 
Exercise rights to annually approve & terminate advisory 
contract 
15 U.S.C. § 80a-
15(a) 
Annually approve the contract with the fund’s principal 
underwriter 
15 U.S.C. § 80a-
15(b) 
Annually select the fund’s independent public accountant  
15 U.S.C. § 80a-
31(a)  
Select preparer of fund’s financial statements, unless 
selected by shareholder vote 
15 U.S.C. § 80a-
31(b) 
Play a role in assessing securities underlying repurchase 
agreements 
17 C.F.R. § 270.5b-3 
Approve agreement for fund, as part of underwriting 
syndicate, to acquire securities  
17 C.F.R. § 270.10f-
1(e) 
Approve & monitor securities purchases from affiliated 
underwriting syndicates  
17 C.F.R. § 270.10f-
3(c)(10) 
Approve & monitor fund’s participation in 12b-1 share 
distribution plan  
17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-
1 
Approve interim advisory contracts 17 C.F.R. § 270.15a-
4(b) 
Approve & monitor affiliate purchase & sale transactions  
17 C.F.R. § 270.17a-
7(e) 
Approve affiliated mergers  
17 C.F.R. § 270.17a-
8(a)(2) 
Approve joint liability insurance contracts with fund 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-
 
42. Some board responsibilities are omitted.  See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 270.6e-2(b)(9) 
(setting forth duties of boards with respect to variable life insurance separate accounts); 
17 C.F.R. § 270.23c-3 (setting forth duties of closed end companies that are engaging in 
repurchase offers). 
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affiliates 1(d)(7)  
Approve & monitor affiliated broker remuneration 
17 C.F.R. § 270.17e-
1(b) 
Annually approve contract with fund’s custodian  
17 C.F.R. § 270.17f-
1(d) 
Make certain decisions regarding the custody of fund 
assets 
17 C.F.R. § 270.17f-
2 
Approve petty cash account & controls on its use 
17 C.F.R. § 270.17f-
3 
Delegate & oversee foreign custodian arrangements 17 C.F.R. § 270.17f-
5(b)  
Annually approve form & amount of fidelity bonds, 
including joint insured bonds 
17 C.F.R. § 270.17g-
1(d)-(g)  
Approve & monitor codes of ethics 17 C.F.R. § 270.17j-
1(c) 
Approve plans for multiple class funds 
17 C.F.R. § 270.18f-
3(d) 
Determine when fund’s NAV will be calculated each day 
17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-
1(d)  
Establish substitute to shareholder ratification of 
independent public accountant 
17 C.F.R. § 270.32a-
4  
Approve compliance policies and procedures and chief 
compliance officer  
17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-
1(a) 
 
TABLE II: Responsibilities Unique to Money Market Mutual Fund 
Boards 
MMF Board’s Responsibility 
Paragraph of 
Rule 2a-7
43
 
Designate nationally recognized statistical rating 
organizations on which MMF can rely  
(a)(11)(i) 
Determine whether an unrated security is of comparable 
quality to a rated security 
(a)(12) & (14) 
Determine how fund shares are priced   (c)(1) 
Determine which securities present minimal credit risks 
and thus are appropriate investments 
 (c)(3)(i) 
Determine risk associated with securities subject to a 
conditional demand feature  
 (c)(3)(iv)(B) 
 
43. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7. 
11
  
1104 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  34:3 
Evaluate seller’s creditworthiness in connection with 
repurchase agreement acquisitions 
 (c)(4)(ii)(A) 
Determine that MMFs in portfolio in excess of 
diversification limits satisfy rule 2a-7 
 (c)(4)(ii)(E) 
Determine that demand features or guarantees are not 
basis for credit quality determination 
 (c)(6) 
Determine appropriate action if security is downgraded or 
otherwise requires reassessment 
 (c)(7)(i)(A) 
Determine whether to override requirement to exercise a 
portfolio security’s demand feature 
 (c)(7)(i)(C) 
Determine whether to override requirement to dispose of 
a troubled portfolio security 
 (c)(7)(ii) 
Establish procedures to maintain, and monitor, fund’s 
stable NAV under amortized cost method 
 (c)(8)(i) 
Establish interval for determining deviation from market 
NAV 
 (c)(8)(ii)(A)(1) 
Periodically review deviations from market NAV (c)(8)(ii)(A)(2) 
Determine appropriate action if the deviation from 
market price exceeds 0.5 percent  
 (c)(8)(ii)(B) 
Cause fund to act to reduce dilution or unfair results of 
material deviation from market price.  
 (c)(8)(ii)(C) 
Minimize price deviations for funds using the penny-
rounding method 
 (c)(9) 
Determine likelihood of deemed issuers for asset-backed 
securities purchased by the fund 
 (c)(10)(iv) 
Determine appropriate intervals for stress testing ability 
to maintain stable NAV 
 (c)(10)(v) 
Guide & monitor delegates if board delegates 
responsibilities to the fund’s adviser or officers 
 (e) 
 
III. Money Market Funds During the Crisis of 2007-2009 
 
Until the most recent crisis, money market funds had not attracted 
much attention from those looking for trouble in the financial system. 
Highly regulated and diversified in their holdings, MMFs were thought 
of to be safe, low-risk investments.
44
 The events of 2007 through 2009 
 
44. See, e.g., Marcin Kacperczyk & Philipp Schnabl, How Safe Are Money Market 
Funds?, 128 Q.J. ECON. 1073, 1074 (2013) [hereinafter Kacpercyzk & Schnabl, How 
Safe Are MMFs?] (explaining that before the financial crisis, “investors regarded money 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/4
 2014] OPENING THE GATE  1105 
cast money market funds in a new, less favorable light. Looking briefly 
at the problems that MMFs encountered and the market and government 
responses helps to lay the groundwork for considering the various 
options for addressing those problems, including our proposal to allow 
boards to gate their funds when faced by such redemption pressures. 
 
A. ABCP Crisis and Its Effect on Money Market Funds 
 
Prime MMFs, those that invest in money market instruments other 
than simply Treasury and agency securities, began to feel the effects of 
the subprime mortgage crisis in mid-2007 when asset-backed 
commercial paper markets (ABCP) came under stress.
45
  In 2007, 
twenty-five percent of global prime MMFs were invested in ABCP,
46
 
which is commercial paper backed by revenue-generating assets such as 
mortgages and credit card receivables.
47
  By July 2007, outstanding 
ABCP in the United States had grown to a peak of $1.16 trillion.
48
  A 
very difficult period for ABCP followed, and MMFs, along with other 
ABCP purchasers, responded by treating ABCP more warily than they 
had before. 
On August 9, 2007, just weeks after two Bear Stearns hedge funds 
filed for bankruptcy following losses on subprime loans, three funds 
managed by the French bank BNP Paribas, unable to value their portfolio 
securities backed by subprime mortgages, stopped redemptions.
49
  The 
 
funds as a low-risk investment that was almost as safe as cash.  Indeed, for most of their 
history, money funds had invested in safe assets and had generated yields similar to those 
of U.S. Treasuries.”). 
45. PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., MONEY MARKET FUND REFORM 
OPTIONS 11 (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2010/ic-29497.pdf. 
46. MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., MONEY MARKET FUNDS: ABCP INVESTMENTS 
DECREASE 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.mfdf.org/images/uploads/blog_files/Moodys_MMF_ABCP_Dec_2011.pdf. 
47. For a helpful description of how ABCP is issued and how ABCP programs 
function, see Richard G. Anderson & Charles S. Gascon, The Commercial Paper Market, 
The Fed, and the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis, 91 FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 
589, 591-93 (2009) [hereinafter Anderson & Gascon], available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/09/11/Anderson.pdf. 
48. Daniel M. Covitz et. al., The Evolution of a Financial Crisis: Panic in the 
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Market 39 tbl.2 (Divs. of Research & Statistics and 
Monetary Affairs, Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 2009-36, 2009), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200936/200936pap.pdf. 
49. See Sebastian Boyd, BNP Paribas Freezes Funds as Loan Losses Roil Markets, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 9, 2007), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aW1wj5i.vyOg; see also 
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head of BNP’s division of asset management and services was quoted as 
saying, “For some of the securities there are just no prices, . . . As there 
are no prices, we can’t calculate the value of the funds.”50 These events 
prompted more widespread concern about the quality of the assets 
underlying ABCP.
51
 Accordingly, ABCP interest rates rose, and the 
amount of ABCP outstanding fell, markedly during the following year.
52
 
By one estimate, in August 2007, approximately twenty-five percent of 
ABCP programs experienced runs, meaning that lenders refused to roll 
over ABCP when it expired.
53
 MMFs were among the investors that 
pulled their money out of ABCP.
54
MMFs and other ABCP investors did 
not experience large losses as a result of ABCP troubles because  
guarantees by the bank sponsors of ABCP programs prevented losses.
55
 
Even without big losses, the 2007 ABCP experience caused MMFs 
to adjust their portfolios. As Kacperczyk and Schnabl explain, the 
emergence of problems in the ABCP markets caused “a repricing of risks 
in money markets” that enabled MMFs to choose “whether to invest in 
assets with a substantial risk premium to safe government securities.”56  
Many prime funds chose to move assets out of commercial paper and 
 
Marcin Kacperczyk & Philipp Schnabl, When Safe Proved Risky: Commercial Paper 
During the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 37-38 (2010) 
[hereinafter “Kacpercyzk & Schnabl, When Safe Proved Risky”]. 
50. Boyd, supra note 49 (quoting Interview with Alain Papiasse, Head of BNP 
Paribas Asset Management & Services Division). 
51. For a contemporaneous manifestation of this concern, see, e.g, Fed. Reserve 
Bd., Transcript of the Meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee app. 1 at 170 tbl.2 
(Sept. 18, 2007) available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20070918material.pdf (Table 
2 was entitled “ABCP Spreads Widen as Concerns Increase Regarding Underlying 
Collateral”). 
52. Kacperczyk & Schnabl, When Safe Proved Risky, supra note 49, at 38.  Average 
spreads for ABCP had increased from a high of six basis points above the federal funds 
rate in 2007 to forty-seven basis points in August 2007; Covitz et al., supra note 48, at 
12. 
53. Enrique Schroth, et. al., Dynamic Debt Runs and Financial Fragility: Evidence 
from the 2007 ABCP Crisis 17 (May 18, 2012) (unnumbered working paper), available at 
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/itay%20goldstein%20conference/Dynamic_Debt_Runs_
Estimation_May2012.pdf . 
54.  Kacperczyk & Schnabl, When Safe Proved Risky, supra note 49, at 39. 
55. See Viral V. Acharya, et. al., Securitization Without Risk Transfer, 107 J. FIN. 
ECON. 515, 516 (2013) (finding that “somewhat surprisingly, this crisis in the ABCP 
market did not result (for the most part) in losses incurred by those actually invested in 
ABCP.  Instead, the crisis had a profoundly negative effect on commercial banks because 
banks had (in large part) insured outside investors in ABCP by providing explicit 
guarantees to conduits, which required banks to pay off maturing ABCP at par.”). 
56. Kacperczyk & Schnabl, How Safe are MMFs?, supra note 44, at 1077. 
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into bank certificates of deposit and other safer assets.
57
 
 
B. The Reserve Primary Fund’s Collapse 
 
One of the funds that invested in high-risk assets in the hope of 
higher returns was the Reserve Primary Fund.
58
 As the Investment 
Company Institute’s Money Market Working Group documents, the 
Reserve Primary Fund had nearly sixty percent of its assets in 
commercial paper by July 2008, compared to one percent a year earlier.
59
 
Its yield correspondingly rose and the fund moved from the bottom 
twenty percent (in terms of yield) to the top ten percent of institutional 
funds.
60
 Institutional investors responded to these high yields and its 
assets doubled between July 2007 and July 2008.
61
  The fund’s share of 
the total net assets in prime institutional MMFs rose from 1.7% to 3.5% 
in the same time period.
62
 
Among the types of commercial paper that the Reserve Primary 
Fund purchased during this period was commercial paper issued by 
financial institutions, including Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.
63
  By 
August 2008, the Reserve Primary Fund held $785 million in Lehman 
commercial paper and medium-term notes,
64
 or approximately 1.18% of 
 
57. Naohiko Baba et al., US Dollar Money Market Funds and Non-US Banks, 
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS Q. REV. 65, 70 graph 2 (Mar. 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1516354. 
58. This decision apparently ran counter to the instincts of Reserve Fund founder, 
Bruce Bent, who was quoted in November 2007 as saying, “`When you get involved in 
this contest for when you can make [three] basis points more here or [two] basis points 
more there, that's insane, . . . It’s not what I designed the money fund to do.”  Shannon D. 
Harrington & Christopher Condon, Bank of America, Legg Mason Prop Up Their Money 
Market Funds, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 13, 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
“Bruce Bent, chairman of Reserve Funds, who in 1970 created the first money-market 
fund”), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aWWjLp8m3J1I&refer=h
ome. 
59. INV. CO. INST., REPORT OF THE MONEY MKT. WORKING GRP., supra note 8, at 57. 
60. Id. at 54-56. 
61. Id. at 55. 
62. Id. at 56. 
63. See, e.g., Complaint at ¶ 35, SEC v. Reserve Mgmt. Co., 673 F. Supp. 2d 182 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09 Civ. 4346(PGG)), 2009 WL 1321174 [hereinafter SEC Reserve 
Complaint] (explaining that “In 2007 and 2008, however, the Fund began to purchase 
riskier commercial paper issued by financial institutions, including Lehman, Merrill 
Lynch, and Washington Mutual.”). 
64. REPORT OF THE MONEY MKT. WORKING GRP., supra note 8, at 57. 
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the fund’s $62.5 billion assets under management.65 On September 15, 
2008, after Lehman’s bankruptcy filing, the board of the Reserve 
Primary Fund held an emergency meeting and revalued the Lehman debt 
at eighty percent of par.
66
 The high volume of redemption requests 
reflected deep investor concern about the securities.
67
 On September 16, 
the Reserve Primary Fund announced that the Lehman securities had 
been written down to zero, the fund’s net asset value had fallen to $0.97, 
and there would be a seven-day delay on redemptions.
68
  The Fund had 
“broke[n] the buck,” meaning that its stated NAV had fallen below the 
$1.00 that is a distinguishing feature of MMFs—a notable event because 
it had only happened to an MMF once before.
69
 
The Reserve Fund Board’s decision to delay filling redemption 
requests was intended to curb additional losses that the fund would have 
incurred if it had to meet those redemption requests by selling securities 
at a loss.
70
  On September 22, the SEC retroactively granted the fund an 
exemptive order under section 22(e)(3) of the Investment Company Act 
 
65. Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Boards of Trustees of the Reserve Fund, 
FOIA Confidential Treatment Requested by The Reserve, at 1 (Sept. 15, 2008), available 
at 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/reserve_primary_fund_investors/osnato_declaration_exhibit
_03.pdf. 
66. Id. at 2. 
67. See, e.g., id. at 3 (noting that there were $16.5 billion in redemption requests by 
1:00 P.M. on the fifteenth of September). 
68. Press Release, The Reserve (Sept. 16, 2008), available at http://www.primary-
yieldplus-inliquidation.com/pdf/PressRelease2008_0916.pdf; see also SEC Reserve 
Complaint, supra note 63, at ¶ 121. 
69. Vanucci, Securities Act Release No. 7625, 68 SEC Docket 2661 (Jan. 11, 
1999).  The Community Bankers U.S. Government Money Market Fund broke the buck 
in 1994.  Id.  Its investors were primarily community banks and, at its high point, it had 
$150 million in assets under management.  Id.  Approximately 27.5% of its assets were in 
structured notes that were either issued by, or guaranteed by, the U.S. government or a 
government agency.  Id.  When these notes dropped in value because of an increase in 
interest rates, the fund broke the buck.  Id.  The fund liquidated and investors received 
$0.961 per share.  Id.  The SEC, in an enforcement action against two employees of the 
fund’s sub-adviser explained that “[a]t  27-1/2 percent of the Fund’s assets, the Notes 
were unsuitable investments for the Fund because they were too risky and volatile for a 
money market fund, such as the Fund, seeking to maintain a stable NAV.  At no time did 
the Fund disclose that the level of the Notes held by the Fund would make it likely that 
the Fund would be unable to maintain a NAV of $1.00 per share.”  Id. 
70. See Press Release, The Reserve, SEC Order Granted to Protect the Interest of 
Reserve Shareholders (Sept. 23, 2008) (“Any attempt to sell these securities to meet large 
redemption requests would result in sales at a loss, thereby affecting the Funds’ net asset 
values.”) [hereinafter Press Release, The Reserve (Sept. 23, 2008)], available at 
http://www.primary-yieldplus-
inliquidation.com/pdf/PressReleaseStatementofOrderPurpose2008_0923.pdf. 
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to allow the fund to suspend redemptions  “until the markets are liquid to 
a degree that enables each Fund to liquidate portfolio securities without 
impairing the net asset value of each Fund, or the Commission, on its 
own initiative, rescinds the order . . . .”71  As the board explained, the 
SEC’s order would enable the fund to sell its assets through “an orderly 
sale process that seeks to obtain best pricing for the interest of 
shareholders and integrity of the funds’ NAV.”72 Over the course of 
almost two years, the Reserve Primary Fund liquidated and returned to 
its shareholders over ninety-nine percent of fund assets as of the close of 
business on September 15, 2008.
73
 
 
C. Other Funds’ Troubles and the Drivers of Redemption Activity 
 
The Reserve Primary Fund was not the only MMF to run into 
trouble, but MMFs were not uniformly affected by the market strains of 
fall 2008.  Academic literature indicates that MMF redemptions were 
primarily driven by concerns surrounding each fund’s portfolio risk as 
measured by past yield and liquidity. These findings seem consistent 
with investors’ incentives to exit early from MMFs that are likely to run 
into trouble, while the MMF still has liquid assets with which to redeem 
their shares at one dollar.
74
 
Institutional and prime MMFs were most heavily affected. 
Presumably because institutional investors were more sensitive to the 
implications of remaining in a troubled fund, they were much more 
active redeemers than retail investors.
75
 Federal Reserve economist 
 
71. The Reserve Fund, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,386, 73 Fed. Reg. 
55,572 (Sept. 25, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ic/2008/ic-28386.pdf.  
This order covered both the Reserve Primary Fund and the Reserve U.S. Government 
Fund. 
72. See Press Release, The Reserve (Sept. 23, 2008), supra note 70. 
73. See Press Release, The Reserve, Reserve Primary Fund to Distribute $215 
Million (Jul. 15, 2010) [hereinafter Press Release, The Reserve (Jul. 15, 2010)], available 
at http://www.primary-yieldplus-inliquidation.com/pdf/PrimaryDistribution_71510.pdf. 
74. For a discussion of this dynamic, see SEC, DIV. OF RISK, STRATEGY & FIN. 
INNOVATION, RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS POSED BY COMMISSIONERS AGUILAR, PAREDES, 
AND GALLAGHER 1-4 (2012) [hereinafter DIV. OF RISK, STRATEGY & FIN. INNOVATION], 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/money-market-funds-memo-
2012.pdf. 
75. See, e.g., Lawrence Schmidt et al., Runs on Money Market Mutual Funds 3 
(Jan. 2, 2013) (unnumbered working paper) (finding that “prime institutional funds 
exhibited much larger persistence in outflows than retail funds, although retail investors 
also exhibited some run-like behavior”), available at 
http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/files/Documents/Centers/CFP/WermersMoneyFundRuns.pd
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Patrick McCabe estimates that during the month starting September 10, 
2008, institutional prime MMFs were depleted by thirty percent 
compared to five percent for retail prime MMFs.
76
 Government MMFs—
which were relatively liquid and transparent—experienced inflows, 
including from investors who had redeemed their prime MMF 
holdings.
77
  By one estimate, during the week in which the Reserve Fund 
broke the buck, investors redeemed $310 billion—or fifteen percent of 
prime MMF assets—from prime MMFs.78 
Even among prime MMFs, investors were discerning in deciding 
whether to run.  Economists Kacperczyk and Schnabl find that “that 
funds with more money fund business and funds that took more risks 
before Lehman’s default experienced larger runs.”79  McCabe finds that 
MMFs with higher portfolio yields (an indicator of portfolio risk) were 
more likely to experience outflows, as were funds with higher sponsor 
credit default swap spreads (an indicator of sponsor risk).
80
  Likewise, 
 
f. 
76. Patrick E. McCabe, The Cross Section of Money Market Fund Risks and 
Financial Crises 9 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 2010-51, 2010) [hereinafter 
McCabe, The Cross Section of MMF Risks], available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201051/201051pap.pdf. 
77. According to the SEC staff, government MMF assets increased forty-four 
percent ($409 billion) between September 2, 2008 and October 7, 2008.  See DIV. OF 
RISK, STRATEGY & FIN. INNOVATION, supra note 74, at 7.   Prime MMF assets fell twenty-
four percent ($498 billion) in the same time period.  Id.  See also id. at 8-9 (citing “flight 
to quality,” “flight to liquidity,” and “flight to transparency” as possible explanations for 
investors’ shift into government MMFs); Schmidt et al., supra note 75, at 8-9 (explaining 
that government MMF investors were attracted to “the liquidity of the Treasury market as 
safety”). 
78. PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 45, at 12. 
79. Kacperczyk & Schnabl, How Safe are MMFs?, supra note 44, at 1078. 
80. See McCabe, The Cross Section of MMF Risks, supra note 76, at 34; see also 
Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher M. Gandia, Money Market Funds Run Risk: Will 
Floating Net Asset Value Fix the Problem? 20 (Columbia Univ. Sch. of Law, Working 
Paper No. 426, 2012) [hereinafter Gordan & Gandia] (finding that, among European 
MMFs, those that “had ‘reached for yield’” or had investment bank sponsors experienced 
highest run rates sponsors), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2134995; Philip E. Strahan & Basak 
Tanyeri, Once Burned, Twice Shy: Money Market Fund Responses to a Systemic 
Liquidity Shock 16 (July 2012) J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (forthcoming) 
(reporting findings “strongly suggest[ing] that during the post-Lehman days investors 
fled risk. This finding is strong for both investor types, although magnitudes are larger for 
institutional investors.”), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2156257; Baba et al., supra note 57, 
at 73 (noting that “[t]he largest redemptions occurred at institutional prime funds 
managed by the remaining securities firms and small independent managers, which 
investors doubted could support their funds.”). 
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economists Lawrence Schmidt, Allan Timmerman, and Russ Wermers 
find that sophisticated institutional investors “chased yields in larger, 
low-expense funds prior to the crisis, and considered the potential of a 
complex to ‘backstop’ its institutional funds when deciding on whether 
to move their money during the crisis.”81  They found also that funds 
with less liquid portfolios experienced more run behavior.
82
  They further 
find that “[w]hile the median prime institutional fund experienced only 
mild outflows during the crisis, funds in the left tail (of the outflow 
distribution) experienced extremely large outflows.”83 
This uneven pattern of investor redemptions in times of crisis—
characterized by heightened investor pullback from less liquid and riskier 
funds—also has manifested in other contexts. During the ABCP crisis, 
German MMFs with illiquid assets experienced massive redemptions 
while more liquid MMFs actually experienced inflows.
84
 In fact, from 
July 2007 to June 2008, the most illiquid quartile of German MMFs 
accounted for approximately sixty percent of all German MMF 
outflows.
85
 A similar pattern emerged when concerns over European 
sovereign debt financing peaked during the summer of 2011; U.S. prime 
MMFs with high risk exposure to at-risk European banks experienced a 
significantly higher degree of redemptions than comparable funds that 
were not as exposed to this risk.
86
 
 
 
81. Schmidt et al., supra note 75, at 3. 
82. Id. at 38 (finding “that runs were more pronounced among funds that had less 
liquidity, in terms of their lower holdings of securities that matured with seven days”); 
see DIV. OF RISK, STRATEGY & FIN. INNOVATION, supra note 74, at 8 (citing “flight to 
liquidity” as a possible explanation for large shift away from prime MMFs into 
government MMFs). 
83. Schmidt et al., supra note 75, at 14. 
84. See Stephan Jank & Michael Wedow, Sturm und Drang in Money Market 
Funds: When Money Market Funds Cease to Be Narrow 30 (Deutsche Bundesbank, 
Discussion Paper Series 2, Banking and Financial Studies No. 20/2008, 2009) 
(concluding that, “[d]uring the liquidity crisis of 2007/2008 we observe runs (ger.: 
‘Sturm’) on money market funds with enhanced and illiquid portfolios. Money market 
funds with more liquid portfolios, in contrast, had no significant outflows and functioned 
as a safe haven.”), available at 
http://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/news/conferences/12fmc/12fmc_wedow.pdf. 
85. Id. at 25 fig.6(b). 
86. See Sergey Chernenko & Adi Sunderam, Frictions in Shadow Banking: 
Evidence from the Lending Behavior of Money Market Funds 3 (Fisher Coll. of Bus., 
Working Paper No. 2012-4, 2012) (finding that between June and August 2011, “for 
institutional funds, a [ten percent] higher exposure to Eurozone banks is associated with 
an annualized outflow of [twenty-two percent] of assets”), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1991171. 
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D. Sponsor Support 
 
The Reserve Primary Fund was the only MMF to break the buck 
during the 2007-2009 period, but additional MMFs might have broken 
the buck if not for the support provided by MMF sponsors.  Fund 
sponsors are not obligated to provide support, but sometimes do so in an 
effort to halt runs, maintain their reputation, and avert having a MMF 
break the buck or liquidate.
87
  The support they provide can come in 
different forms, including purchasing distressed assets from funds at par 
or amortized value, capital contributions, capital support agreement, 
guarantees, or buying a letter of credit for the fund.
88
 As a consequence, 
it is difficult to identify and quantify instances of sponsor support. 
Some sponsor support came early in the crisis when the ABCP 
markets began to experience trouble.  The SEC said, without identifying 
the relevant time period, that it was aware of “at least 44 money market 
funds that were supported by affiliates because of [Structured Investment 
Vehicle] investments.”89  SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro later testified 
that the SEC staff had identified a total of 300 instances of sponsor 
support since MMFs’ inception in the 1970s.90  One hundred of those 
instances, according to Schapiro’s testimony, took place during 
September 2008.
91
  From August 2007 to the end of 2008, the SEC 
estimates that almost twenty percent of MMFs received sponsor 
support.
92
 Moody’s identified 208 instances of sponsor support in the 
 
87. MOODY’S INVESTOR SERV., SPONSOR SUPPORT KEY TO MONEY MARKET FUNDS 2 
(2010) (discussing reasons for sponsor support), available at 
http://www.alston.com/files/docs/Moody%27s_Report.pdf. 
88. See Perspectives on Money Market Mutual Fund Reforms: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, at 3 n.2 (June 21, 2012) (testimony of 
Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC) [hereinafter Schapiro Testimony], available at 
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=
66f4ddb5-4823-4341-bad9-8f99cdf5fe9a.   
89. Money Market Fund Reform, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,807, 74 
Fed. Reg. 32,688, 32,691 n.38 (proposed July 8, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
270 & 274) [hereinafter 2009 SEC Proposing Release]; see Shannon D. Harrington & 
Christopher Condon, Bank of America, Legg Mason Prop Up Their Money Market 
Funds, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 13, 2007) (discussing some instances of sponsor support), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aWWjLp8m3J1I&refer=h
ome. 
90. See Schapiro Testimony, supra note 88, at 3. Note that Schapiro’s testimony did 
not include a list of instances of support and provided few supporting details.  Id. 
91. Id. at 6. 
92. 2009 SEC Proposing Release, supra note 89, at 32,693. 
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U.S. and Europe.
93
  Of these, 146 occurred before the crisis and sixty-
two occurred during the crisis.
94
  Of the sponsor support instances during 
the crisis, approximately thirty-six were in the U.S.
95
  Kacperczyk and 
Schnabl identified twenty-eight instances of sponsor support in the week 
after Lehman’s default.96 
Economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, analyzing 
sponsor support from 2007 to 2011, found that seventy-eight funds 
received an aggregate of $4.4 billion in sponsor support on a total of 123 
occasions.
97
  They found that the support came in response to Lehman 
holdings, distressed ABCP, and other troubled securities from several 
exposed funds.
98
  They identified twenty-one instances in which the fund 
might have broken the buck without the support.
99
  The largest single 
instance of sponsor support took place on September 14, 2008, when the 
Russell Money Market Fund’s sponsor purchased the fund’s $336.8 
million Lehman holdings, equaling 6.3% of the fund’s total assets under 
management.
100
 
Sponsor support was not the only method fund managers used to 
address redemptions.  Funds sold assets,
101
 liquidated,
102
 and shifted their 
 
93. MOODY’S INVESTOR SERV., supra note 87, at 4 fig.2.  Prior to the crisis, the 
biggest drivers of sponsor support were interest rates and Orange County’s default in 
1994 and problems at General American Life Insurance in 1999.  Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 4. 
96. See Kacperczyk & Schnabl, How Safe Are MMFs?, supra note 44, at 1111 & 
1116-1118 tbl.A.1. 
97. See Steffanie A. Brady et al., The Stability of Prime Money Market Mutual 
Funds: Sponsor Support from 2007 to 2011 4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Working 
Paper RPA 12-3, 2012), available at 
http://www.bos.frb.org/bankinfo/qau/wp/2012/qau1203.pdf.  The authors employed a 
narrow definition of sponsor support that excluded capital support agreements and letters 
of credit.  Id. at 2. 
98. See id. at12-13 (listing the issuers of defaulted securities held by prime MMFs 
and purchased by sponsors between 2007 and 2008 and the instances in which that 
particular issuers’ defaulted securities prompted sponsor support in excess of 0.5 percent 
of a MMF’s assets under management). 
99. Id. at 5-6. 
100. Id. at 6 ( “While such a large exposure seems inconsistent with the [five 
percent] concentration limit of Rule 2a-7, it is important to note that such limits are only 
in effect at the time of purchase.  In addition, this Fund experienced significant net 
redemptions prior to the direct support action . . . .”) (footnote omitted). 
101. See, e.g., Strahan & Tanyeri, supra note 80, at 19 (“[M]oney funds hit by large 
outflows responded by using maturing assets to meet cash demands and, when necessary, 
by selling their most liquid claims.  As a result, the liquidity shock led such funds to be 
stuck holding high-risk assets such as commercial paper.”). 
102. See, e.g., Press Release, Federated, Inc., Federated Investors, Inc. and Putnam 
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portfolios from commercial paper to cash, Treasury securities, and other 
short-term securities.
103
  MMFs’ new conservatism made it harder for 
financial institutions to fund themselves, as they are highly dependent on 
MMFs as purchasers of their commercial paper.
104
  As banks’ ability to 
fund themselves in the commercial paper market declined, so too did 
their ability to make loans.
105
 
 
E. The Government’s Response 
 
In response to the redemption pressures on MMFs, the size of the 
MMF sector,
106
 and the resulting pressures in the funding markets, the 
 
Investments Announce Transaction to Benefit Money Market Fund Shareholders (Sept. 
24, 2008), available at 
http://www.federatedinvestors.com/FII/about/pressrelease/detail.do?cid=65207 
(announcing liquidation of Putnam Prime Money Market Fund and transfer of assets and 
shareholders to Federated Prime Obligations Fund). 
103. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 45, at 12 
(discussing the increase in short-term instruments and approximately twenty-five percent 
decline in commercial paper holdings by MMFs); Kacperczyk & Schnabl, When Safe 
Proved Risky, supra note 49, at 41 (noting the decline in MMF holdings of commercial 
paper from 24.2% to 16.9% of assets within a month of Lehman’s bankruptcy). 
104. See Kacperczyk & Schnabl, When Safe Proved Risky, supra note 49, at 40 
(depicting the change in the spread between overnight commercial paper, financial 
commercial paper, and corporate commercial paper, respectively, and the Federal funds 
rate after the Lehman bankruptcy); HAL S. SCOTT, COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS., 
REGULATION, INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION 128-130 (2012), available at 
http://capmktsreg.org/2012/11/discussion-paper-examining-interconnectedness-and-
contagion-in-the-financial-system/ (discussing commercial paper contraction).  For a 
discussion of the role of MMFs in funding financial institutions, see also Kacperczyk & 
Schnabl, When Safe Proved Risky, supra note 49, at 35-36 & 41 (discussing importance 
of MMFs as purchasers of commercial paper and effects of MMFs’ decreased purchases 
during the fall of 2008); see also Samuel G. Hanson et al., An Evaluation of Money 
Market Fund Reform Proposals 5-6 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper, Dec. 20, 2012), 
available at http://www.people.hbs.edu/shanson/MMF_Reform_20121220_FINAL.pdf. 
105. See, e.g., Tobias Adrian et al., The Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper 
Funding Facility, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV. 29 (May 2011) [hereinafter Adrian et al.], 
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/11v17n1/1105adri.pdf (describing 
the shrinkage of, and declining maturities in, the commercial paper market and noting 
that “[t]he sudden disruption in commercial paper issuance led to higher issuing costs, 
forced asset sales by entities unable to raise cash, resulted in greater insolvency risk 
among issuers, and increased pressure on credit lines from commercial banks”); 
Kacperczyk & Schnabl, When Safe Proved Risky, supra note 49, at 42 (noting that, 
“many financial intermediaries used commercial paper to finance their lending activities 
and so the increased difficulty in issuing commercial paper sharply reduced their abilities 
to provide loans to firms and individuals”). 
106. MMFs had $3.5 trillion and prime MMFs had $2.1 trillion in assets under 
management as of September 10, 2008.  Burcu Duygan-Bump et al., How Effective Were 
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government stepped in with a number of emergency programs.  The 
Federal Reserve stepped up efforts already underway before September 
2008.
107
  These programs appear to have had the desired effect of 
inducing investments in MMFs and stabilizing short-term debt 
markets.
108
 
 
1.  Treasury’s Temporary Guarantee Program 
 
The emergency program most directly relevant to MMFs was an 
unprecedented government insurance program for existing MMF 
investors, which the Department of Treasury (Treasury) announced on 
September 19, 2008.  The announcement noted that MMFs are important 
to investors and the financial institutions they fund and contended that 
“[m]aintaining confidence in the money market fund industry is critical 
to protecting the integrity and stability of the global financial system.”109  
Treasury went on to argue that, absent intervention, additional MMFs 
might break the buck, which would “undermine[] investor 
confidence.”110  Under the program, which was open to all MMFs 
established under rule 2a-7, funds could elect to pay a premium to 
Treasury in exchange for a guarantee that redeeming investors would 
 
the Federal Reserve Emergency Liquidity Facilities? Evidence from the Asset-Backed 
Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, 68 J. FINANCE 715, 
718 (2013) (citing iMoneyNet). 
107. See Stephen G. Cecchetti, Crisis and Responses: The Federal Reserve in the 
Early Stages of the Financial Crisis, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 51, 64 (2009), available at 
http://dss.ucsd.edu/~grondina/pdfs/week5_cecchetti_earlyfedresponse.pdf (discussing 
government actions through May 2008); see also Kacperczyk & Schnabl, When Safe 
Proved Risky, supra note 49, at 42-43 (discussing Federal Reserve’s actions in wake of 
ABCP troubles in 2007). 
108. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 45, at 13 
(noting that “[t]he announcements of these government programs substantially slowed the 
run on prime MMFs.  Outflows from prime MMFs diminished to about $65 billion in the 
week after the announcements and, by mid-October, these MMFs began attracting net 
inflows.  Moreover, in the weeks following the government interventions, markets for 
commercial paper and other short-term debt instruments stabilized considerably.”); 
TREASURY STRATEGIES, INC., DISSECTING THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE OF 2007-2008 9 
(2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-619/4619-188.pdf (indicating an 
inflow of $132 billion into prime MMFs from September 22 through the end of 2008). 
109. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Announces Guaranty Program 
for Money Market Funds (Sept. 19, 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/hp1147.aspx. 
110. Id.; see U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT 
TREASURY’S TEMPORARY GUARANTEE PROGRAM FOR MONEY MARKET FUNDS (Sept. 29, 
2008), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1163.aspx. 
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receive no less than one dollar for every dollar in MMF investments 
made on or before September 19, 2008.
111
  The guarantee expired on 
September 19, 2009.
112
  The government’s guarantee of the multi-trillion 
dollar MMF industry was backed by the fifty billion dollar Exchange 
Stabilization Fund, which was created by the Gold Reserve Act of 1934 
to help maintain stability in exchange rates and foreign exchange 
markets.
113
 
Taking advantage of the inexpensive insurance,
114
 most MMFs 
participated in the guarantee program.
115
  As the following chart 
demonstrates, almost 1,500 MMFs representing $3.2 trillion in assets, or 
ninety-three percent of total MMF assets, participated during the initial 
phase from September 19 to December 18, 2008.
116
  By its expiration on 
September 18, 2009, participation had fallen to sixty-eight percent of 
 
111. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 110. 
112. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Announces Extension of 
Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds (Nov. 24, 2008), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1290.aspx (extending 
program until April 30, 2009); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury 
Announces Extension of Temporary Guarantee (Mar. 31, 2009), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg76.aspx. (extending program 
through September 18, 2009). 
113. For a pre-crisis explanation of the purpose of the Exchange Stabilization Fund 
see FED. RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, FEDPOINT: EXCHANGE STABILIZATION FUND 
(2007) (explaining that the Fund “buys and sells foreign currency to promote exchange 
rate stability and counter disorderly conditions in the foreign exchange market” and 
“provide[s] short-term credit to foreign governments and monetary authorities and to 
hold and administer Special Drawing Rights”), 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed14.html.  By mentioning “global 
instability” in its announcement of the program, the Treasury may have been seeking to 
justify a non-traditional use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund. 
114. The fees MMFs paid depended on their net asset value.  See CONG. OVERSIGHT 
PANEL, NOVEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: GUARANTEES AND CONTINGENT PAYMENTS IN 
TARP AND RELATED PROGRAMS 34 (2009), available at http://fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-docs/2009-11-
06%20COP%20Guarantees%20in%20TARP.pdf (detailing fees during different program 
phases). 
115. To date, the identity of the MMFs that enrolled in the Treasury’s Temporary 
Guarantee Program has not been made publicly available.  By contrast, other participants 
in federal emergency programs have been released, albeit reluctantly.  See, e.g., Bob Ivry 
et al., Secret Fed Loans Gave Banks $13 Billion Undisclosed to Congress, BLOOMBERG 
(Nov. 27, 2011), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-28/secret-fed-
loans-undisclosed-to-congress-gave-banks-13-billion-in-income.html (reporting on a 
court case that forced the Federal Reserve to release the list of over 21,000 transactions 
that took place between the Federal Reserve and 190 foreign and domestic firms).  
116. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 114, at 35 fig.3. 
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total MMF assets.
117
 
 
TABLE III: Temporary Guarantee Program Participation
118
 
Program 
Phase 
Participating 
Investment 
Companies 
(company 
could enroll 
multiple 
funds) 
Assets of 
Participating 
Funds ($ 
Billions) 
Participating 
Funds’ Assets 
as % of MMF 
Market 
Premiums 
Collected ($ 
Billions) 
Phase 1 
(Sept. 19, 
2008-Dec. 
18, 2008) 
366 3,217.4 93 .3316 
Phase 2 
(Dec. 19-
2008-April 
30, 2009) 
352 3,118.0 83 .4817 
Phase 3 
(May 1, 
2009-Sept. 
18, 2009) 
296 2,470.0 68 .3865 
 
The program brought in approximately $1.12 billion in premiums 
and did not pay any money out to MMF shareholders.
119
  The focus on 
the fees received under the program can be misleading if not measured 
against the fact that taxpayers bore the program’s risks and 
administrative costs.
120
  Private insurers would only have assumed such 
risks, if at all, on a fund-by-fund basis using risk-based pricing.  Because 
government provided insurance as adverse events were unfolding, any 
assessment of the program must also take moral hazard costs into 
consideration.  One of the features of MMFs that had always 
 
117. Id. 
118. Id. (based on information provided by the Department of the Treasury). 
119. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Announces 
Expiration of Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 19, 2009) (highlighting 
fact that that the program “generate[d] $1.2 billion in participation fees for U.S. 
Taxpayers”), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/tg293.aspx. 
120. For a discussion of the need to consider risk as well as return, see Harry 
Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952). 
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distinguished them from bank accounts was the absence of federal 
deposit insurance.  Treasury’s actions in September 2008 changed that 
and created harmful new expectations among MMF investors that the 
government would back MMFs’ stable net asset value in the future.  
Although a post-crisis amendment to the Gold Reserve Act outlawed the 
future use of the Fund to rescue domestic MMFs,
121
 investors could infer 
that Treasury’s creative efforts to insure the stable value of MMFs during 
2008 would be repeated in a future crisis.
122
 
 
2.  Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund     
Liquidity Facility 
 
Complementing Treasury’s guarantee program was the Federal 
Reserve’s Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund 
Liquidity Facility (AMLF), which was also established on September 19, 
2008 under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.
123
  The program 
enabled banks and other financial institutions to borrow from the Federal 
Reserve discount window in order to purchase high-quality ABCP from 
MMFs.
124
  The loans were collateralized by the ABCP.  Federal Reserve 
Chairman Ben Bernanke explained that the AMLF “effectively 
channeled liquidity to the funds, helping them to meet redemption 
demands without having to sell assets indiscriminately.”125  AMLF 
 
121. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 131(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5236(b) 
(stating that “[t]he Secretary is prohibited from using the Exchange Stabilization Fund for 
the establishment of any future guaranty programs for the United States money market 
mutual fund industry.”). 
122. See, e.g., Chernenko & Sunderam, supra note 86, at 11-12 (finding that “once 
conditions normalized after the crisis, incentives to take risk remained: the funds that 
took larger risks before Lehman also took on exposure to Eurozone banks during the 
spring of 2011”).  But see Strahan & Tanyeri, supra note 80, at 26 (downplaying moral 
hazard concerns of the Treasury guarantee program on the grounds that participating 
MMFs did not increase their risk profiles).  The fact that funds that directly participated 
in the program reduced their risk profiles immediately after the crisis is not dispositive 
proof that moral hazard is not a problem. 
123. See Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012); see also Fed. Reserve Bd., 
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) 
(Dec. 13, 2012), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_amlf.htm. 
124. Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd. (Sept. 19, 2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/20080919a.htm. 
125. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve Bd. of Governors, Stamp 
Lecture, London, England (Jan. 13, 2009) [hereinafter Bernanke], available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090113a.htm. 
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lending reached its high point of $152 billion on October 1, 2008.
126
 
 
3.  Commercial Paper Funding Facility 
 
On October 7, 2008, the Federal Reserve announced another 
program under section 13(3)
127—the Commercial Paper Funding Facility 
(“CPFF”).128 Under the CPFF, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
established a special purpose vehicle to purchase three-month 
commercial paper directly from issuers.
129
 Only high-quality (as 
measured by credit ratings), U.S. dollar-denominated commercial paper 
was eligible, and there were caps on the amount that could be purchased 
from any single issuer.
130
 The goal of the program was to lower 
borrowing costs for commercial paper issuers and give the market 
confidence that issuers would be able to roll over their commercial paper 
when it matured.
 131 
The CPFF was a major buyer in the commercial 
paper market and grew to hold over twenty percent of outstanding 
commercial paper.
132
 The CPFF’s role in the commercial paper markets 
gradually lessened, and the program expired on February 1, 2010.
133
 
In total, the Federal Reserve guaranteed over three trillion dollars of 
MMF assets and directly purchased approximately $370 billion of 
commercial paper.
134
  By February 2009, prime MMF assets under 
 
126. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 114, at 54 n.260. 
127. Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2008). 
128. For a discussion of the CPFF, the conditions out of which it arose, and the 
Federal Reserve’s objectives, see Adrian et al., supra note 105; Anderson & Gascon, 
supra note 47, at 607-609; see also Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., Board Announces 
Creation of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) to Help Provide Liquidity to 
Term Funding Markets (Oct. 7, 2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081007c.htm. 
129. See Commercial Paper Funding Facility: Programs Terms and Conditions, 
FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. (Oct. 14, 2008), 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/CPFF_Terms_Conditions.html. 
130. Id. 
131. Bernanke, supra note 125 (“By serving as a backup source of liquidity for 
borrowers, the Fed’s commercial paper facility was aimed at reducing investor and 
borrower concerns about ‘rollover risk,’ the risk that a borrower could not raise new 
funds to repay maturing commercial paper.  The reduction of rollover risk, in turn, should 
increase the willingness of private investors to lend, particularly for terms longer than 
overnight.”). 
132. See Anderson & Gascon, supra note 47, at 608 & fig.11. 
133. Adrian et al., supra note 105, at 35-36. 
134. Kacperczyk & Schnabl, When Safe Proved Risky, supra note 49, at 48.  The 
Federal Reserve also created the Money Market Investor Funding Facility “to provide 
liquidity to U.S. money market mutual funds in order to increase their ability to meet 
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management had recovered to almost $1.2 trillion—above October 2008 
lows of roughly $950 billion, but still down from September 2008 levels 
of near $1.4 trillion.
135
 
 
IV. SEC’s September 2010 Money Market Fund Reforms 
 
The problems some MMFs experienced during the financial crisis 
inspired a rethinking of their regulatory structure. The SEC finalized an 
initial set of reforms in 2010,
136
 but the commission
137
 and others 
anticipated that other reforms would follow.
138
 The nature of those 
further reforms is a current matter of debate. In order to put proposals for 
further reform—including our gating proposal—in context, a brief 
discussion of the SEC’s 2010 reforms is necessary. These reforms 
tightened restrictions on MMFs’ portfolio holdings, improved disclosure, 
and—importantly as a precursor for our proposal—strengthened MMF 
boards’ ability to suspend redemptions. 
 
A. Liquidity Requirements 
 
The 2010 amendments to rule 2a-7 tightened MMFs’ liquidity 
requirements. First, the cap on illiquid securities—securities that cannot 
be sold at carrying value within seven days—was dropped from ten 
percent of total fund assets to five percent of a fund’s portfolio.139 
 
redemption requests and to enhance money market investors’ willingness to invest in 
money market instruments, particularly for terms longer than overnight.” Bd. of Govs. of 
the Fed. Res. System, Regulatory Reform: Money Market Investor Funding Facility (last 
visited July 20, 2014), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_mmiff.htm. The program was never 
used and expired on October 30, 2009. Id. 
135. INV. CO. INST., REPORT OF THE MONEY MKT. WORKING GRP.., supra note 8, at 
67 & fig. 6.9. 
136. Money Market Fund Reform, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,132, 
75 Fed. Reg. 10,060 (Mar. 4, 2010) [hereinafter SEC 2010 Adopting Release], 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2010/ic-29132fr.pdf (amending or adding 17 C.F.R. §§ 
270.2a-7, 270.17a-9, 270.22e-3, 270.30b1-6T, 270.30b1-7 & 274.201). 
137. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves Money Market Reforms 
to Better Protect Investors (Jan. 27, 2010) (quoting SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-14.htm (billing these reforms as 
the “first step” of MMF regulatory reform). 
138. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A 
NEW FOUNDATION (2009), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/documents/finalreport_web.pdf. 
139. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(c)(5)(i) (2013). Until 2010, MMFs were subject to the 
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Second, the SEC required MMFs to invest at least ten percent of fund 
holdings in “daily liquid assets,” and at least thirty percent of holdings in 
“weekly liquid assets.”140 Third, amended rule 2a-7 requires periodic 
stress testing to ensure that funds are able to maintain a stable NAV 
based on 
 
hypothetical events that include, but are not limited to, a 
change in short-term interest rates, an increase in 
shareholder redemptions, a downgrade of or default on 
portfolio securities, and the widening or narrowing of 
spreads between yields on an appropriate benchmark the 
fund has selected for overnight interest rates and 
commercial paper and other types of securities held by 
the fund.
141
 
 
Finally, the amendments imposed a general liquidity requirement, 
pursuant to which MMFs must “hold securities that are sufficiently liquid 
to meet reasonably foreseeable shareholder redemptions . . .”142 
 
B. Portfolio Quality Requirements 
 
The SEC’s 2010 amendments also tightened portfolio quality 
requirements.
143
  First, the 2010 amendments lowered the cap on second 
 
generally applicable ten percent limit under the Investment Company Act.  See 
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b)(1); see also Investment 
Company Act Release No. 13,380, 48 Fed. Reg. 32,555, 32,561 (July 18, 1983), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/1983/ic-13380.pdf (the SEC’s accompanying 
release for the first Rule 2a-7, in which it states that “money market funds relying on 
[Rule 2a-7], like any other open-end management company, must limit their portfolio 
investments in illiquid instruments to not more than ten percent of their net assets”); 17 
C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(a)(19) (2013) (defining “illiquid security”). 
140. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(c)(5)(ii) & (iii). The SEC defines “daily liquid assets” as 
cash, U.S. government debt, or “securities that will mature or are subject to a Demand 
Feature that is exercisable and payable within one Business Day.” Id. § 270.2a-7 
(a)(8)(iii). “Weekly liquid assets” are defined as cash, U.S. government debt, other 
government securities with a maturity of less than sixty days, or “securities that will 
mature or are subject to a Demand Feature exercisable and payable within five Business 
Days.” Id. § 270.2a-7 (a)(32)(iv). 
141. Id. § 270.2a-7(c)(10)(v). 
142. Id. § 270.2a-7(c)(5). 
143. Rule 2a-7 places securities in several different categories.  An “eligible 
security” is generally a security with a remaining maturity of 397 calendar days or less 
that either has received a credit rating agency rating in one of the two highest short-term 
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tier securities from five percent to three percent.
144
 Second, the amount a 
MMF can invest in second tier securities of a particular issuer was 
reduced from one percent to half a percent.
145
 Third, the maximum 
allowed remaining maturity for second-tier securities was reduced from 
397 days to forty-five calendar days.
146
 Finally, the new rule 2a-7 
includes stricter limits on MMFs’ investments in repurchase 
agreements.
147
 
 
C. Maturity Requirements 
 
The SEC’s 2010 reforms also shortened maturity requirements.  
First, the dollar-weighted average portfolio maturity (“WAM”) for 
MMFs was reduced from ninety to sixty calendar days.
148
 Second, a new 
dollar-weighted average life (“WAL”) limitation of 120 days was 
added.
149
 Unlike the WAM, the WAL does not allow for exceptions to 
standard maturity calculations for adjustable rate securities, variable rate 
securities, and other specially-valued securities that MMFs are permitted 
to hold.
150
 
 
 
 
 
rating categories or is an unrated security that the board has determined to be of 
comparable rating.  Id. § 270.2a-7(a)(12).  A first tier security is generally an eligible 
security that has received a short-term rating in the highest category or is of comparable 
quality as determined by the board.  Id. § 270.2a-7(a)(14).  A second tier security is any 
other eligible security.  Id. § 270.2a-7(a)(24). 
144. Id. § 270.2a-7(c)(3)(ii). 
145. Id. § 270.2a-7(c)(4)(i)(C). 
146. Id. § 270.2a-7(c)(3)(ii). 
147. The SEC amended rule 2a-7 to require that repurchase agreements be 
collateralized by cash or government securities.  See id. § 270.2a-7(a)(5) (defining 
“collateralized fully”); id. § 270.2a-7(c)(4)(ii)(A) (requiring that repurchase agreements 
be collateralized fully); SEC 2010 Adopting Release, supra note 136, at 10,080 
(describing change in permissible collateral for repurchase agreements).  The SEC also 
reinstated a requirement that the board or its delegate assess the creditworthiness of 
repurchase agreement counterparties.  17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(c)(4)(ii)(A). 
148. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(c)(2)(ii). 
149. Id. § 270.2a-7(c)(2)(iii). 
150. See SEC 2010 Adopting Release, supra note 136, at 10,072 (“Unlike weighted 
average maturity, the weighted average life (or ‘WAL’) of a portfolio is measured 
without reference to any rule 2a–7 provision that otherwise permits a fund to shorten the 
maturity of an adjustable-rate security by reference to its interest rate reset dates.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
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D. Disclosure Requirements 
 
The 2010 amendments to rule 2a-7 also included new disclosure 
requirements.
151
  First, funds must post detailed portfolio holdings within 
five business days of each month’s end and leave them posted for at least 
six months.
152
  Second, MMFs must electronically file each month with 
the SEC interactive data portfolio holdings on new Form N-MFP.
153
 
Importantly, the information includes a market-based NAV (shadow 
NAV).
154
 The SEC publicly discloses the Form N-MFP information sixty 
days “after the end of the month to which the information pertains.”155 
Before the 2010 amendments, there was no requirement for website 
disclosure, and funds only had to disclose shadow NAVs to the SEC 
twice a year, with a sixty-day delay.
156
 
 
E. Credit Ratings 
 
Credit ratings issued by Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations (“NRSROs”)—credit rating agencies that are recognized 
and regulated by the SEC—have long been a component of MMF 
regulation under rule 2a-7.
157
 The 2010 amendments to rule 2a-7 added a 
requirement to rule 2a-7 that MMF boards annually designate and assess 
the reliability of at least four NRSROs.
158
 The ratings of chosen NRSROs 
are used by the fund to determine whether a security meets the portfolio 
 
151. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(c)(12). 
152. Id. 
153. Id. § 270.30b1-7(a); see SEC, Form N-MFP [hereinafter Form N-MFP], 
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn-mfp.pdf (last visited July 20, 2014). 
154. See Form N-MFP, supra note 153, at 3-4 (Items 18 and 25). 
155. 17 C.F.R. § 270.30b1-7(b). 
156. 17 C.F.R. § 274.101 (2008) (Sub-item 74W of Form N-SAR); see SEC 2010 
Adopting Release, supra note 136, at 10,085 n.337. 
157. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(62), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(62) 
(2012) (defining “NRSRO”).  A discussion of the evolution of NRSROs and their 
regulatory framework is beyond the scope of this article.  For a consideration of these 
issues, see, e.g., White, An Assessment of the Credit Rating Agencies, supra note 12.  The 
Dodd-Frank Act required the SEC and other agencies to remove references to credit 
ratings from their regulations.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act § 939A (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2010).  The SEC proposed, but did not adopt, 
a rule to implement section 939A with respect to the Investment Company Act.  See 
References to Credit Ratings in Certain Investment Company Act Rules and Forms, 76 
Fed. Reg. 12,896, 12,898 (proposed Mar. 9, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 
270 & 274). 
158. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(a)(11) (2013). 
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quality standards established by Rule 2a-7.
159
 A fund board may not 
exclusively rely on credit ratings, however, in determining whether the 
fund should acquire a security.
160
  The SEC eliminated a prohibition on 
purchasing asset-backed securities that have not been rated by an 
NRSRO.
161
 
 
F. Suspension of Redemptions 
 
The 2010 amendments made a number of changes to address 
situations in which a MMF has broken or is about to break the buck.  
First, the amendments required MMFs to develop the capability of 
redeeming shares at a price based on a market NAV rather than a stable 
NAV.
162
  Second, the amendments make it is easier for affiliates to 
purchase distressed assets without case-by-case SEC approval.
163
 The 
final change, and the one that lays the groundwork for our proposal, 
allowed funds to suspend redemptions, subject to certain conditions. 
The SEC adopted this rule under section 22(e) of the Investment 
Company Act, which provides that, except in certain limited 
circumstances, “[n]o registered investment company shall suspend the 
right of redemption, or postpone the date of payment or satisfaction upon 
redemption of any redeemable security in accordance with its terms for 
 
159. See, e.g., id. § 270.2a-7(a)(12) (defining “eligible security”); id. § 270.2a-
7(a)(14) (defining “first tier security”); id. § 270.2a-7(a)(24) (defining “second tier 
security”). 
160. Id. § 270.2a-7(c)(3)(i) (stating that, “[t]he money market fund shall limit its 
portfolio investments to those United States Dollar-Denominated securities that the 
fund’s board of directors determines present minimal credit risks (which determination 
must be based on factors pertaining to credit quality in addition to any rating assigned to 
such securities by a Designated NRSRO) . . . .”). 
161. See SEC 2010 Adopting Release, supra note 136, at 10,070 ( “NRSROs 
rapidly downgraded ABSs from their status as first tier securities over a short time period 
during 2007–2008.  The NRSROs thus did not seem to play a role in buttressing the 
minimal credit risk analysis of fund management sufficient to warrant a requirement that 
all ABSs be rated to be eligible for money market fund investment.  We would otherwise 
have expected a slower, more orderly downgrading process for these ABSs, which would 
have permitted money market funds to gradually roll off the paper.”) (footnotes omitted). 
162. § 270.2a-7(c)(13) (requiring that a MMF “(or its transfer agent) shall have the 
capacity to redeem and sell securities issued by the fund at a price based on the current 
net asset value per share . . . includ[ing] the ability to redeem and sell securities at prices 
that do not correspond to a stable net asset value or price per share”). 
163. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.17a-9 (2013); SEC 2010 Adopting Release, supra note 
136, at 10,088-89 (explaining amendments to rule 17a-9); see also § 270.2a-
7(c)(7)(iii)(B) (requiring MMFs to promptly notify SEC of purchases under rule 17a-9). 
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more than seven days. . ..” unless one of three exceptions is satisfied.164  
The exceptions are when: (1) trading on the New York Stock Exchange 
is closed or restricted; (2) “an emergency exists as a result of which (A) 
disposal by the company of securities owned by it is not reasonably 
practicable or (B) it is not reasonably practicable for such company fairly 
to determine the value of its net assets”; or (3) any other time the SEC 
has allowed by order “for the protection of security holders of the 
company.”165  Section 22(e) further directs the SEC to determine by rule 
“the conditions under which (i) trading shall be deemed to be restricted 
and (ii) an emergency shall be deemed to exist. . ..”166 The SEC has 
issued some exemptive orders under section 22(e),
167
 but did not adopt a 
permanent rule under section 22(e) until the 2010 amendments. 
New rule 22e-3, which replaced a temporary rule adopted during the 
crisis,
168
 provides an exemption from Investment Company Act section 
22(e).
169
 Under rule 22e-3, a MMF is exempt from section 22(e) if the 
board, including a majority of the disinterested directors, (1) determines 
that “that the extent of the deviation between the fund’s amortized cost 
price per share and its [market-based] current net asset value per share . . 
. may result in material dilution or other unfair results to investors or 
existing shareholders” and (2) has irrevocably approved the fund’s 
liquidation.
170
  The SEC explicitly reserved the right to reverse or modify 
the exemption “[f]or the protection of shareholders.”171 
As the SEC explained when it adopted the rule, the rule “is intended 
to reduce the vulnerability of investors to the harmful effects of a run on 
 
164. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 22(e), 15 U.S.C. §80a-22(e) (2012). 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. See, e.g., Reserve Municipal Money-Market Trust, et al.[,] Notice of 
Application and Temporary Order, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,993 (Oct. 31, 2008); The Reserve 
Fund, on Behalf of Two of Its Series, the Primary Fund and the U.S. Government Fund: 
Order Temporarily Suspending Redemption of Investment Company Shares, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 55,572 (Sept. 25, 2008); Order Temporarily Suspending Redemption of Investment 
Company Shares Pursuant to Section 22(e)(3) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 
54 Fed. Reg. 50,567 (Dec. 7, 1989). 
168. The SEC adopted interim temporary final rule 22e-3T in conjunction with the 
Treasury guarantee program for MMFs.  Temporary Exemption for Liquidation of 
Certain Money Market Funds, 73 Fed. Reg. 71,919 (Nov. 26, 2008) (adding 17 C.F.R. § 
270.22e–3T).  The rule provided an exemption from section 22(e) for funds that had 
experienced an event that would trigger coverage under the program and had commenced 
liquidation proceedings.  See 17 C.F.R. § 270.22e–3T (2009). 
169. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 22(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (2012). 
170. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22e-3(a)(1) (2013). 
171. § 270.22e-3(c). 
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the fund, and minimize the potential for disruption to the securities 
markets.”172  Nevertheless, the requirement that the fund be in the 
process of liquidation is a significant limitation on the rule’s ability to 
protect MMF investors from runs.  Our proposal would remove that 
limitation. 
 
V. Proposals for More Fundamental MMF Reform 
 
With the 2010 amendments in place,
173
 attention turned to more 
fundamental MMF reform.  Arguably, the 2010 reforms, which 
homogenized MMF portfolios and thus increased the industry’s 
vulnerability to a common shock, made further reform even more 
necessary.
174
  Chairman Schapiro favored floating the NAV, capital 
buffers, and minimum balance at risk requirements,
175
 reform ideas about 
which three of her colleagues had reservations.
176
  In addition to 
 
172. SEC 2010 Adopting Release, supra note 136, at 10,088. 
173. Most of the SEC’s 2010 MMF reforms became effective on May 5, 2010.  Id. 
at 10,060. 
174. For a discussion of concentration in MMF portfolio holdings, see Fin. Stability 
Oversight Council, Proposed Recommendations Regarding Money Market Mutual Fund 
Reform, 77 Fed. Reg. 69,455, 69,463 (Nov. 19, 2012) [hereinafter FSOC Proposed 
Recommendations], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-11-
19/pdf/2012-28041.pdf (“The similarity of MMF holdings increases the contagion risk to 
the entire MMF industry and to the broader financial system in the event that one MMF 
encounters stress.”). 
175. Chairman Schapiro’s roughly outlined proposal appeared to include two 
reform alternatives.  The first was “that money market funds float the NAV and use 
mark-to-market valuation like every other mutual fund.”  The second was “a tailored 
capital buffer of less than [one percent] of fund assets, adjusted to reflect the risk 
characteristics of the money market fund” that would be “combined with a minimum 
balance at risk requirement. That requirement would enable investors to redeem up to 
[ninety-seven percent] of their assets in the normal course as they do today. However, it 
would require a [thirty-day] holdback of the final [three percent] of a shareholder's 
investment in a money market fund.”  Press Release, Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, 
Statement of SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro on Money Market Fund Reform (Aug. 22, 
2012), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-166.htm [hereinafter Schapiro, 
Statement on Money Market Fund Reform]. 
176. See Press Release, Daniel M. Gallagher & Troy A. Paredes, Comm’rs, SEC, 
Statement on the Regulation of Money Market Funds, (Aug. 28, 2012), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch082812dmgtap.htm (explaining that they 
were “concerned that the Chairman’s proposal would, at a minimum, severely 
compromise the utility and functioning of money market funds, which would inflict harm 
on retail and institutional investors”); Press Release, Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, SEC, 
Statement Regarding Money Market Funds (Aug. 23, 2012), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch082312laa.htm (“I remain concerned that the 
Chairman’s proposal will be a catalyst for investors moving significant dollars from the 
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internally generated proposals, reform ideas have come from other 
regulators,
177
 academics,
178
 and industry.
 179
  Among the most notable of 
 
regulated, transparent money market fund market into the dark, opaque, unregulated 
market. . . . Such transfers could cause significant damage to the country’s short-term 
capital markets.”). 
177. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 45, at 4-6 
(discussing the benefits and costs of several potential options for further reform, 
including floating the NAV, setting up private emergency liquidity facilities, requiring 
certain redemptions to be in-kind, insuring MMFs, imposing additional requirements on 
stable NAV funds, restricting stable NAV funds to retail investors, regulating stable NAV 
MMFs like special purpose banks, and increasing restrictions on MMF alternatives); 
Patrick E. McCabe et al., The Minimum Balance at Risk: A Proposal to Mitigate the 
Systemic Risks Posed by Money Funds, 564 FED. RESERVE BANK OF N. Y. STAFF REP. at 
1, 1 (2012) [hereinafter McCabe et al., The Minimum Balance at Risk], available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr564.pdf (recommending that funds 
withhold redemption of and subordinate a portion of investors’ balances—a minimum 
balance at risk—in order to slow redemptions and absorb fund losses); William C. 
Dudley, For Stability’s Sake, Reform Money Funds, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 14, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-14/for-stability-s-sake-reform-money-
funds.html (recommending floating the NAV and requiring capital buffers and minimum 
balance at risk for MMF shareholders); Eric S. Rosengren, Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., 
Money MARKET MUTUAL FUNDS AND FINANCIAL STABILITY: REMARKS AT THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA’S 2012 FINANCIAL MARKETS CONFERENCE 9 (Apr. 11, 2012), 
available at http://www.bos.frb.org/news/speeches/rosengren/2012/041112/041112.pdf 
(recommending floating the NAV, or “requir[ing] money market funds to hold capital, 
and to impose a cost on redemptions”). 
178. See, e.g., Hillary J. Allen, Money Market Fund Reform Viewed Through a 
Systemic Risk Lens, 11 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 87, 101-09 (2010) (recommending an insurance 
scheme for MMFs); Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29 
YALE J. ON REG. 91, 110-111 (2012) (recommending floating NAV, redemption-in-kind 
triggers, an insurance scheme, or “a private-sector liquidity backstop”); William A. 
Birdthistle, Breaking Bucks in Money Market Funds, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1155, 1161 
(2010) [hereinafter Birdthistle] (recommending floating NAV or insurance scheme); Jill 
Fisch & Eric Roiter, A Floating NAV for Money Market Funds: Fix or Fantasy?, 2012 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1003, 1043-1049 (2012) [hereinafter Fisch & Roiter] (recommending 
requiring MMFs to obtain capital, liquidate or switch to floating NAV if its mark-to-
market price is more than one-half of one percent away from one dollar; placing 
limitations on fund boards’ ability to suspend redemptions; and increasing disclosure 
with respect to the possibility and consequences of breaking the buck); Gordon & 
Gandia, supra note 80, at 23-24 (recommending that MMFs be required to have sponsor-, 
third-party, or shareholder-funded capital buffer or imposing a redemption holdback); 
WORKING GRP. ON FIN. REFORM, GRP. OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK 
FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 29 (Jan. 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.group30.org/images/PDF/Financial_Reform-
A_Framework_for_Financial_Stability.pdf (“Money market mutual funds wishing to 
continue to offer bank-like services, such as transaction account services, withdrawals on 
demand at par, and assurances of maintaining a stable net asset value (NAV) at par, 
should be required to reorganize as special-purpose banks, with appropriate prudential 
regulation and supervision, government insurance, and access to central bank lender-of-
last-resort facilities.”); Hanson et al., supra note 104, at 14-20; Mark Perlow, Money 
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Market Funds—Preserving Systemic Benefit, Minimizing Systemic Risks, 8 BERKELEY 
BUS. L.J. 74, 92 (2011) (recommending private liquidity facility as preferred option and 
fund buffers as possible second-best solution); SQUAM LAKE GRP., REFORMING MONEY 
MARKET FUNDS 4 (Jan. 14, 2011) [hereinafter SQUAM LAKE GRP. ], available at 
http://www.squamlakegroup.org/Squam%20Lake%20MMF%20January%2014%20Final.
pdf (recommending that managers of stable NAV MMFs be required to maintain a buffer 
of “dedicated liquid financial resources”); Bruce Tuckman, Federal Liquidity Options: 
Containing Runs on Deposit-Like Assets without Bailouts and Moral Hazard 13 (Ctr. for 
Fin. Stability, Policy Paper, Working Paper, Jan. 24, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2018873 (recommending that the 
Federal Reserve auction off a finite amount of federal liquidity options that enable 
nonbanks such as MMFs to borrow from the Federal Reserve during a crisis).  But see 
Jonathan Macey, Reducing Systemic Risk: The Role of Money Market Mutual Funds as 
Substitutes for Federally Insured Bank Deposits, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 131, 132 
(2011) (arguing against additional reforms on the grounds that they could undermine the 
important role MMFs play in the financial system). 
179. See, e.g., BLACKROCK, MONEY MARKET FUNDS: A PATH FORWARD 4 (Sept. 12, 
2012), available at 
https://www2.blackrock.com/webcore/litService/search/getDocument.seam?venue=PUB
_INS&source=CONTENT&ServiceName=PublicServiceView&ContentID=1111173537 
(recommending that a standby liquidity fee (SLF), worth twice the difference between the 
mark-to-market NAV and $1 per share, be charged to a fund’s investors when the fund’s 
mark-to-market NAV falls below 99.75 or its weekly liquidity falls below 7.5 percent); 
Letter from Jonathan Curry et al., HSBC Global Asset Mgmt., to the Eur. Comm’n (May 
28, 2012), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2012/shadow/individual-
others/hsbc_en.pdf (recommending that sponsors be “prohibited from supporting their 
MMFs,” that MMFs “be prohibited from being rated,” that MMFs be required to actively 
manage shareholder concentration within a range of five to ten percent, that MMFs be 
able to meet redemption requests in-kind, and that MMFs should be “empowered to 
impose a liquidity fee on redeeming shareholders”); Letter from Scott C. Goebel, Senior 
Vice President, Gen. Counsel, FMR Co., Fid. Invs., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. 
& Exchange Comm’n 14-15 (Feb. 14, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 Fidelity Letter to the 
SEC], available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/mms-response/mmsresponse-34.pdf 
(recommending that government and municipal MMFs not be subject to heightened 
regulatory reform, that MMF’s be required to suspend redemptions and perhaps charge 
temporary liquidity fees automatically when weekly liquid assets “fall significantly” 
below thirty percent of total assets, and that a MMF’s board should be given a 
predetermined period of time during which it would have to decide to either lift the gate 
or liquidate the fund); Letter from Scott C. Goebel, Senior Vice President, Gen. Counsel, 
FMR Co., Fid. Invs. to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exchange Comm’n 10 (Jan. 
10, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Fidelity Letter to the SEC], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-619/4619-36.pdf (recommending “creation of a well 
designed reserve within MMFs”); Letter from F. William McNabb III, Chairman & CEO, 
Vanguard, to Amias Gerety, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Fin. Stability Oversight Council 7 
(Jan. 15, 2013), available at 
https://institutional.vanguard.com/iam/pdf/FSOCmoneyMKT_VG_comment.pdf 
(recommending that when a prime MMF’s weekly liquidity falls below fifteen percent, it 
be required to suspend redemptions temporarily and implement a standby liquidity fee of 
one to three percent); Letter from Karla M. Rabusch, President, Wells Fargo Funds 
Mgmt., to Amias Gerety, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Fin. Stability Oversight Council 13-14 
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these reform recommendations was a formal proposal by the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to recommend that the SEC 
undertake certain reforms.
180
  In June 2013, the SEC put forward three 
potential reform options: floating the NAV of prime institutional MMFs, 
allowing MMFs to impose emergency liquidity fees and redemption 
gates, or some combination of the first two options.
181
  The proposal also 
included some ancillary reforms related to transparency and 
diversification.
182
 
 
(Jan. 17, 2013) [hereinafter Letter from Karla M. Rabusch], available at 
http://www.wellsfargoadvantagefunds.com/pdf/mmf/20130117_FSOC_CommentLetter.p
df (finding liquidity fees and temporary redemption gates to be the lowest cost reform 
option and finding it sensible for a one percent fee to be “triggered” when one week 
liquidity falls to fifteen percent, while also endorsing the consideration of “greater 
transparency and disclosure” for MMFs); Letter from Paul Schott Stevens, President & 
CEO, Inv. Co. Inst., to Amias Gerety, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Fin. Stability Oversight 
Council 50 (Jan. 24, 2013) [hereinafter Paul Schott Stevens Letter to Amias Gerety], 
available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/13_fsoc_mmf_recs.pdf (commenting that while the 
Institute does not yet “concede” the need for further reform, liquidity gates and fees 
would be the best reform alternative if FSOC “can demonstrate that changes are needed 
for prime money market funds”). 
180. FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 174, at 69,456 (proposing to 
recommend floating the NAV, pairing a one percent NAV buffer to absorb day-to-day 
fluctuations with a three percent investor minimum balance at risk to absorb losses in 
excess of the NAV buffer, or pairing a three percent NAV buffer with other measures 
such as stricter disclosure and diversification requirements).  Apart from controversy over 
the substance of the reforms, the FSOC’s action also raised concerns about the propriety 
of the engagement of the FSOC, a multi-regulator systemic oversight body, in the SEC’s 
rulemaking process.  See, e.g., Hester Peirce & Robert Greene, Expert Commentary, 
Money Market Maneuvering, MERCATUS CTR. AT GEORGE MASON UNIV. (Sept. 19, 
2012), available at http://mercatus.org/expert_commentary/money-market-maneuvering. 
181. Money Market Fund Reform, Amendments to Form PF for the SEC, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 36,834, 36,849, 36,878, 36,899 (June 19, 2013) (to be codified at 17 CFR pt. 210, 
230, 239, 270, 274, & 279) [hereinafter SEC 2013 Money Market Fund Reform 
Proposal], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-06-19/pdf/2013-
13687.pdf.  See also Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes Money Market Fund Reforms 
(June 5, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2013/2013-101.htm. 
182. These proposed changes include a new Form N-CR, which a MMF must file 
with the SEC and post on its website whenever it experiences a “significant” event such 
as sponsor support, portfolio security default events, or a drop in market NAV below 
$.9975.  See SEC 2013 Money Market Fund Reform Proposal, supra note 181, at 36,934-
36,940, 36,995 (discussing proposed Form N-CR).  The SEC also proposed enhanced 
disclosures, including daily disclosure of the current market NAV (rounded to the fourth 
decimal place) and daily and weekly liquidity, more frequent public disclosure of 
portfolio holdings, historical NAV information, and historical instances of sponsor 
support.  See id. at 36,924-34 (discussing proposed disclosure requirements).  The SEC 
proposed enhanced disclosure on Form N-MFP, including more identifying information 
about portfolio securities, maturity dates, for portfolio securities, the amount of cash held, 
weekly gross redemptions and subscriptions, and the concentration of shares held by the 
fund’s twenty largest shareholders.  See id. at 36,941-44 (discussing proposed Form N-
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Before turning to our proposal, we discuss several of the key reform 
ideas that have found their way into the FSOC and SEC proposals.  An 
important point to keep in mind is that any of these proposals, including 
our own, would affect the risks and returns associated with investing in 
MMFs.
183
  One proposal might be more tolerable for certain investors 
than it is for others.  The variety in preferences for risk and return among 
investors makes designing the perfect solution for MMFs difficult and 
helps to explain the struggles regulators have had in settling on a reform 
approach.  The SEC could consider testing multiple options through 
multiple pilot programs. 
 
A. Floating the Net Asset Value 
 
One commonly recommended reform is that MMFs be required to 
float their net asset values, which means that MMF investors would buy 
and sell shares of the fund at a price that reflects the market values of the 
securities in their portfolios, rather than at a stable $1 price. A stable or 
constant net asset value distinguishes MMFs from other types of mutual 
funds.  MMFs typically value their shares using amortized cost 
accounting—as opposed to the mark-to-market or fair value accounting 
typically employed by mutual funds—and price them by rounding to the 
nearest penny.
184
  Under the amortized cost method of valuation and the 
 
MFP disclosures).  The SEC also proposed to tighten diversification requirements by 
requiring aggregation of securities issued by affiliates for purposes of compliance with 
rule 2a-7’s five percent issuer concentration cap; subjecting sponsors of asset-backed 
securities vehicles to rule 2a-7’s ten percent guarantor cap; and eliminating a provision 
that permitted up to twenty-five percent of a MMF’s portfolio to have a single guarantor.  
See id. at 36,953-36,964 (discussing proposed diversification restrictions).  The SEC’s 
proposal would strengthen stress testing requirements.  See id. at 36,967-36,972 
(discussing proposed stress test requirements).  The SEC also proposed related 
amendments to Form PF to impose new reporting requirements on providers of non-rule 
2a-7 liquidity funds.  See id. at 36,947-36,953 (discussing proposed amendments to Form 
PF). 
183. For this point, we thank an anonymous reviewer. 
184. Section 2(a)41 of the Investment Company Act governs valuation.  Investment 
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(41) (2012).  Generally, the market value is 
used for securities for which market quotations are readily available and other securities 
are valued at “fair value as determined in good faith by the board of directors.”  Id. 
Securities in which MMFs typically invest lack a secondary market, which makes market 
pricing difficult.  PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 45, at 22 
(explaining that “precise pricing of many money market securities is challenging given 
the absence of active secondary markets”).  Accordingly, almost all MMFs use the 
amortized cost method of valuation and the penny rounding method of pricing in 
conjunction to maintain a stable NAV.  See SEC 2013 Money Market Fund Reform 
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penny rounding method of pricing, “securities held by MMFs are valued 
at acquisition cost, with adjustments for amortization of premium or 
accretion of discount, instead of at fair market value, and the MMFs’ 
price per share is rounded to the nearest penny.”185  The market value is 
reflected in the MMF’s so-called “shadow price,” which is published 
periodically by the fund.
186
  If a MMF’s market NAV remains within a 
narrow band between $.995 and $1.005 and the board does not “believe[] 
the extent of any deviation from the money market fund’s amortized cost 
price per share may result in material dilution or other unfair results to 
investors or existing shareholders,”187 the fund can transact shares at one 
dollar.  MMFs strive to stay within this band to meet investor demand for 
a stable value product, and the investment limitations in rule 2a-7 make 
deviations relatively unlikely.  If a MMF’s shadow price deviates by 
more than half a percent from amortized cost price per share, the fund 
has broken the buck and the board must “promptly consider what action, 
 
Proposal, supra note 181, at 36,835 (noting that most MMFs rely on amortized cost 
valuation and penny rounding and explaining that “[u]nder the amortized cost method, a 
money market fund’s portfolio securities generally are valued at cost plus any 
amortization of premium or accumulation of discount, rather than at their value based on 
current market factors.  The penny rounding method of pricing permits a money market 
fund when pricing its shares to round the fund’s net asset value to the nearest one percent 
(i.e., the nearest penny)” (footnote omitted) (citing to rule 2a-7(a)(2) and (20))).  Since 
shortly after the inception of MMFs, the SEC has found amortized cost accounting to be 
an acceptable method of valuing securities for which market prices are not readily 
available and thus must be valued at “fair value” by the board of directors.  See SEC, 
Accounting Series Release No. 219, Valuation of Debt Instruments by Money Market 
Funds and Certain Other Open-End Investment Companies, in 1 INV. CO. INST., SEC 
VALUATION & LIQUIDITY GUIDANCE FOR REGISTERED INVESTMENT COMPANIES: 
COMPENDIUM 98-102 (2011) (interpreting the Investment Company Act to allow MMF 
boards to determine the fair value for securities with remaining maturities of sixty days or 
less using amortized cost accounting); see also DENNIS R. BERESFORD, Ctr. for Capital 
Mkt. Competitiveness, AMORTIZED COST IS “FAIR” FOR MONEY MARKET FUNDS (Fall 
2012), available at www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/04/Money-Market-Funds_FINAL.layout.pdf (explaining how 
FASB guidance documents and SEC rules and interpretations support MMFs’ use of 
amortized cost accounting due to the very short-term, hold-to-maturity nature of 
securities in which MMFs invest). 
185. See FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 174, at 69,457. 
186. Under rule 2a-7’s “[s]hadow [p]ricing” provision, MMFs have to calculate 
“the extent of deviation, if any, of the current net asset value per share calculated using 
available market quotations (or an appropriate substitute that reflects current market 
conditions) from the money market fund’s amortized cost price per share.”  17 C.F.R. § 
270.2a-7(c)(8)(ii)(A) (2013). 
187. § 270.2a-7(c)(8)(ii)(C).  In that event, “it shall cause the fund to take such 
action as it deems appropriate to eliminate or reduce to the extent reasonably practicable 
such dilution or unfair results.”  Id. 
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if any,” it should initiate.188 
The constant NAV is, from the investor’s perspective, a key feature 
of MMFs.
189
 Because investors generally can withdraw one dollar for 
every dollar they put in, constant NAV MMFs are a popular cash 
 
188. § 270.2a-7(c)(8)(ii)(B). 
189. See, e.g., 2011 Fidelity Letter to the SEC, supra note 179, at 7 (reporting that, 
in response to a survey question highlighting the tax and accounting implications of a 
floating NAV, ninety-two percent of institutional investors expressed a preference for a 
stable NAV); Letter from Am. Pub. Power Ass’n et al., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, 
SEC 1-2 (Jan. 10, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-619/4619-39.pdf 
(co-authored by Gov. Fin. Officers Ass’n; Nat’l Ass’n of Counties; Nat’l Ass’n of State 
Auditors, Comptrollers & Treasurers; Nat’l Ass’n of State Treasurers; Nat’l League of 
Cities; and U.S. Conference of Mayors, commenting that “changing the NAV from fixed 
to floating would make MMMFs far less attractive to investors” and that if a floating 
NAV were to be adopted, most of the members of signatories to the comment letter 
would “divest a significant percentage of their MMMFs””); Letter from William Dressel, 
Jr., Exec. Dir., N.J. State League of Muns., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 1 (Aug. 
28, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-03-13/s70313-75.pdf 
(commenting that the “[m]ost appealing” aspect of MMFs “is their stable $1 net asset 
value”); Letter from Adrienne C. Hodson, Gov’t Relations Specialist, County Comm’rs 
Ass’n of Pa., to Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC 1 (July 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.preservemoneymarketfunds.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/County_Commissioners_Assoc_of_PA_July_2012_134193980
11.pdf (explaining that “many governments have specific policies that mandate that they 
invest in products with stable values, and money market funds are thus used for their 
short-term investments due to the fixed NAV”); Letter from Margaret Mahery, Exec. 
Dir., Tenn. Mun. League, to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC 1 (May 10, 2012), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-619/4619-180.pdf (expressing the view that 
requiring MMFs to float their NAVs would “[h]obble municipal cash management” in 
part because “many governmental bodies, businesses, and institutions operate under legal 
constraints or investment policies that prevent them from investing cash balances in 
instruments that fluctuate in value.”); Letter from Larry L. Long, Exec. Dir., County 
Comm’rs’ Ass’n of Ohio, to Timothy Geithner, Fin. Stability Oversight Council 1 (Dec. 
21, 2012); available at http://www.preservemoneymarketfunds.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/01/County-Commissioners-Assoc-of-Ohio.pdf (explaining that 
MMFs are “popular in Ohio because of their stable [one dollar] net asset value (NAV),” 
which offers “an attractive rate of return with minimal risk” and that “[c]ounty 
governments in Ohio operate under legal constraints or other policies that limit them 
from investing in instruments without a stable value”); Letter from Melinda Sartori, Exec. 
Vice President, Chemung Canal Trust Co., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 1 (July 
31, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-03-13/s70313-46.pdf 
(commenting that the stable NAV is important to their firm because they “use Money 
Funds to perform many different trust, fiduciary and custody account services” and that 
MMFs are useful for these purposes in part “because they offer a stable [one dollar] 
NAV”); TREASURY STRATEGIES, INC., MONEY MARKET FUND REGULATIONS: THE VOICE 
OF THE TREASURER (Apr. 9, 2012) [hereinafter TREASURY STRATEGIES, INC.], available at 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_12_tsi_voice_treasurer.pdf (including a survey of 203 
“financial executives representing corporate, government, and institutional investors,” 
that finds seventy-nine percent “would either decrease use or discontinue” use of MMFs 
if NAVs were required to float). 
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management tool for retail and institutional investors.
190
  Sales of MMF 
shares do not have the same tax implications under wash sale and capital 
gain rules as other mutual fund sales.
191
 MMF investments are treated as 
cash equivalents for accounting purposes.
192
 For retail investors, MMFs 
offer features such as check-writing and ATM access.
193
 These beneficial 
characteristics offset the lower-yields that MMFs typically offer as 
compared to other mutual funds. 
Both the FSOC and the SEC proposed to require that MMFs employ 
a floating NAV instead of a constant NAV.  The FSOC’s proposed 
approach would apply to all MMFs.
194
  The SEC’s proposal distinguishes 
between retail and government funds, which could continue using the 
 
190. For a list of some of the tax and accounting benefits of CNAV MMFs, see INV. 
CO. INST., MONEY MARKET FUNDS IN 2012, A BAD IDEA: FORCING MONEY MARKET 
FUNDS TO FLOAT THEIR NAVS 1-2 (Feb. 14, 2012), available at 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/12_mmf_floating_nav.pdf. 
191. See id.; I.R.S. Notice 2013-48, 2013-31 I.R.B. 120 (“Constant share prices 
have simplified the taxation of MMF share transactions because a shareholder does not 
realize gain or loss when a share is redeemed for an amount equal to its basis.”); see also 
Letter from David T. Bellaire, Esq., Exec. Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Fin. Serv.s 
Inst., to Amias Gerety, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Fin. Stability Oversight Council 7 (Feb. 
15, 2013), available at 
http://www.financialservices.org/uploadedFiles/FSI_Content/Latest_News/AdvocacyUpd
ate_CommentLetterFSOC_MMFReformRecommendations.pdf (explaining that “under 
the stable NAV environment, [MMF] transactions do not generate taxable gains or 
losses” and that, under a floating NAV regime, the IRS’s “wash sale” rule would limit 
“the extent to which shareholders could deduct any loss realized on the redemption.”); 
Paul Schott Stevens Letter to Amias Gerety, supra note 179, at 62-67 (detailing the tax, 
accounting, recordkeeping, and operational advantages of a CNAV). 
192. See Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION § 
305-10-20 (2013) (defining cash equivalents and providing MMFs as an example of 
“items commonly considered to be cash equivalents”); see also Paul Schott Stevens 
Letter to Amias Gerety, supra note 179, at 65 (explaining that MMFs, which are 
considered cash equivalents under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, floating 
NAV funds might not be considered to be cash equivalents). 
193. See Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 
U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1975 (2010) (explaining that investors “commonly use” MMFs 
because of features similar to bank accounts, such as “near-immediate liquidity” and 
“services like check-writing and ATM access”); Letter from Joe Benevento, Managing 
Dir., Deutsche Asset Mgmt., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exchange Comm’n 
(Aug. 31, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-09/s71109-50.pdf 
(explaining that “the Stable NAV fund’s [one dollar] price makes practical many of the 
services retail investors have come to rely on, such as brokerage sweeps, check writing, 
and debit card transactions”). 
194. See FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 174, at 69,466-69 
(discussing proposal to “[r]equire MMFs to have a floating net asset value per share 
(NAV) by removing the special exemption that currently allows MMFs to utilize 
amortized cost accounting and/or penny rounding to maintain a stable NAV.”). 
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stable NAV, and prime institutional funds which would have to use a 
floating NAV.
195
  The rationale for the distinction is that, as discussed 
above, prime MMFs experience significantly higher levels of 
redemptions in times of market stress.
196
 Distinguishing between 
institutional and retail funds is a difficult exercise that is likely to 
produce unintended consequences and costs.
197
  The SEC’s proposal 
 
195. Prime institutional MMFs are estimated to comprise over one-third of total 
MMF assets in the United States.  See INV. CO. INST., Weekly Money Market Mutual 
Fund Assets, available at http://www.ici.org/research/stats/mmf (last visited July 22, 
2014) [hereinafter Weekly Money Market Mutual Fund Assets] (finding that institutional, 
taxable non-government MMFs made up $750.60 billion of the $2.68363 trillion invested 
in all MMFs during the week of February 26, 2013).  The SEC proposes to define a retail 
fund as a MMF that “restricts a shareholder from redeeming more than $1,000,000 in any 
one business day.”  See SEC 2013 Money Market Fund Reform Proposal, supra note 
181, at 36,858-59 (describing rationale for proposed retail fund definition). 
196. See SEC 2013 Money Market Fund Reform Proposal, supra note 181, at 
36,850 & 36,856. (citing the SEC’s November 2012 staff report); see also DIV. OF RISK, 
STRATEGY & FIN. INNOVATION, supra note 74, at 10 (reporting that “[i]nvestor 
redemptions during the financial crisis, particularly after Lehman’s failure, were heaviest 
in institutional share classes of prime money market funds ”). 
197. See, e.g., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, MONEY MARKET FUND SYSTEMIC RISK 
ANALYSIS AND REFORM OPTIONS 22 (2012), available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD379.pdf (pointing out that “in the 
U.S., retail and institutional funds are indistinguishable due to the widespread use of 
omnibus accounts to invest in MMFs”); Letter from Daniel F. Anderson, Senior Vice 
President, MainSource Bank, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 
(Aug. 20, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-03-13/s70313-65.pdf 
(finding that the SEC’s proposed method of differentiating between retail and 
institutional MMF investors is an “artificial distinction” that “does not comport” with the 
methodology used by MainSource Bank to “create liquidity on a regular or as-needed 
basis” for their clients); Letter from Lu Ann Katz, Head of Global Liquidity, Invesco, to 
Amias Gerety, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Fin. Stability Oversight Council 4-5 (Feb. 15, 
2013) [hereinafter Letter from Lu Ann Katz, Head of Global Liquidity, Invesco Ltd., to 
Amias Gerety, Fin. Stability Oversight Council], available at  
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2012-0003-0123 (finding that 
efforts to distinguish between retail and institutional MMFs are “misplaced and 
impractical” because many investors “could easily be characterized as either,” 
administrative costs associated with “tracking individual investors’ activity in order to 
characterize them on an ongoing basis would be extremely onerous,” and that designating 
MMFs as retail and institutional would “unduly favor” fund complexes with more “direct 
individual investors or affiliated omnibus account platforms over those with a more 
diverse investor base . . . .”); Letter from Barbara G. Novick, Vice Chairman & Richard 
K. Hoerner, CFA, Managing Dir., Head of Global Cash Mgmt., BlackRock, to Amias 
Gerety, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Fin. Stability Oversight Council 22 (Dec. 13, 2012), 
available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=090000648118abad&disposition=
attachment&contentType=pdf (approach based on distinguishing retail and institutional 
funds would be “be difficult to implement and may lead to gaming behavior by investors” 
and “may encourage investors to open multiple accounts to appear smaller than they 
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would require MMFs to shift to a $1.0000 (four decimal places) per 
share pricing regime.
198
 Funds using a floating NAV: 
 
would sell and redeem shares at prices that reflect the 
value using market-based factors of their portfolio 
securities and would not penny round their prices. In 
other words, the daily share prices of these money 
market funds would ‘‘float,’’ which means that each 
fund’s NAV would fluctuate along with changes, if any, 
in the value using market-based factors of the fund’s 
underlying portfolio of securities.
199
 
 
Proponents of a floating NAV generally cite two problems with the 
stable NAV—MMFs runs and false expectations about the safety of 
MMFs.  First, they argue that the stable NAV creates a first-mover 
advantage for investors that run during a financial crisis.
200
  When a 
 
are”).  The SEC proposed an exemption from the million-dollar redemption limit for 
omnibus accounts that impose a million dollar limit on the beneficial owners in the 
account.  See SEC 2013 Money Market Fund Reform Proposal, supra note 181, at 
36,861-62 (discussing proposed treatment of omnibus accounts).  Nevertheless, 
compliance with that exemption could be costly and complicated for MMFs and omnibus 
account holders.  See, e.g., Letter from Thomas B. Burkholder, Vice President & Trust 
Officer, Woodlands Bank, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 
(Aug. 20, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-03-13/s70313-64.pdf 
(explaining that compliance with the SEC’s methodology of differentiating between retail 
and institutional customers would be costly, the bank has “no means of controlling the 
size … or frequency” of fund distributions, and that doing so would add an “extra layer” 
of cost); Letter from Lu Ann Katz, Head of Global Liquidity, Invesco Ltd., to Amias 
Gerety, Fin. Stability Oversight Council, at 5 & n.8 (explaining that MMFs with affiliated 
omnibus platforms would have an advantage over MMFs using unaffiliated omnibus 
intermediaries because affiliated platforms “would have access to the underlying investor 
information that would permit them to disaggregate the omnibus account’s holdings”). 
198. See SEC 2013 Money Market Fund Reform Proposal, supra note 181, at 
36,853-54 (explaining rationale for four decimal point pricing).  The FSOC’s floating 
NAV proposal, by contrast, would re-price floating NAV shares to transact at $100.00 
(two decimal places).  See FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 174, at 69,466 
(explaining why $100.00 share pricing is preferable to $1.00 share pricing). 
199. SEC 2013 Money Market Fund Reform Proposal, supra note 181, at 36,849. 
200. See e.g., FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 174, at 69,456 (“In 
effect, first movers have a free option to put their investment back to the fund by 
redeeming shares at the customary stable share price of [one dollar], rather than at a price 
that reflects the reduced market value of the securities held by the MMF.”); Schapiro, 
Statement on Money Market Fund Reform, supra note 175 ( “Under the ‘first-mover 
advantage,’ those who redeem first, get out with their full [one dollar] invested, even if 
the fund’s assets are worth slightly less.  This leaves all the other investors holding the 
bag—usually the slower moving retail investors who can lose both value and access to 
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MMF’s market-based NAV falls below $1.00, investors have a 
significant incentive to redeem at the $1.00 constant NAV, a price that is 
higher than the value of the proportionate share of underlying assets.  
Remaining investors are left with a less liquid and less valuable portfolio.  
The SEC explains the problem this way: 
 
If investors redeem shares when the shadow price is less 
than $1.00, the fund’s shadow price will decline even 
further because portfolio losses are spread across a 
smaller asset base. If enough shares are redeemed, a fund 
can ‘‘break the buck’’ due, in part, to heavy investor 
redemptions and the concentration of losses across a 
shrinking asset base. In times of stress, this reason alone 
provides an incentive for investors to redeem shares 
ahead of other investors: early redeemers get $1.00 per 
share, whereas later redeemers may get less than $1.00 
per share even if the fund experiences no further 
losses.
201
 
 
When MMFs investors run, “systemically important borrowers such 
as large securities dealers could suddenly lose access to a significant 
source of funding,” which could “set off fire sales of securities by dealers 
and, potentially, the failures of systemically important financial 
institutions” could result.202  By diminishing the incentive to run, floating 
the NAV would lessen the number and magnitude of MMF runs and the 
undesirable follow-on effects from such runs.
203
 
 
their money.  They lose the value when the fund reaches a mark-to-market NAV of 
[ninety-nine-and-a-half cents] and breaks the buck.”); Letter from Eric S. Rosengren, 
President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, et al. to Amias Gerety, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, 
Fin. Stability Oversight Council 2 (Feb. 12, 2013), available at 
http://www.bos.frb.org/news/press/2013/pr021213-letter.pdf (The current, stable NAV 
structure “gives rise to a risk of destabilizing MMF runs by creating a first mover 
advantage.  By allowing redemptions at a stable price of [one dollar] per share rather than 
at a share price reflecting the current market value of underlying portfolio assets, MMFs 
give investors a financial incentive to redeem quickly before others during times of stress, 
as losses are borne by the investors remaining in the fund.”). 
201. SEC 2013 Money Market Fund Reform Proposal, supra note 181, at 36,838. 
202. SQUAM LAKE GRP., supra note 178, at 2. 
203. See, e.g., Schapiro, Statement on Money Market Fund Reform, supra note 175 
(“[W]hile the incentive to run may not be reduced entirely, the ‘cliff’ effect of redeeming 
at [one dollar], or getting stuck with a loss and no immediate access to one’s assets would 
no longer exist.”). 
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Floating the NAV could help to mitigate—albeit not eliminate—the 
first-mover advantage, but it would not address the core cause of MMF 
runs.  Evidence suggests that investors run from funds that have taken on 
riskier assets in order to bolster returns, lack liquidity to meet 
redemptions, and are unlikely to be bailed out by their sponsors.
204
 
Floating the NAV would not minimize concerns over the risk and 
liquidity of fund investments and therefore does not address the factors 
that incentivize runs.
205
 If investors are anticipating bad events, they 
would still be incentivized to rapidly redeem from the fund.
206
 Floating 
the NAV would not mitigate the powerful incentives faced by investors 
to redeem before a fund’s most-liquid assets are exhausted to meet the 
redemption requests of other investors.
207
 
Mutual funds other than MMFs and foreign MMFs with floating 
NAVs have not been free of problematic redemptions.  An analysis of 
floating NAV mutual fund data shows that negative shifts in a mutual 
fund’s NAV resulting from investor redemptions signal a deterioration of 
a fund’s anticipated future performance to other investors, thus 
stimulating even more investor redemptions.
208
  Moreover, a study of 
 
204. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.  The sponsor-support 
distinction among MMFs would be eliminated by the FSOC’s proposal, which would 
forbid sponsors of floating NAV funds from providing financial support to their funds.  
See FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 174, at 69,466 (explaining that 
“[b]ecause a floating-NAV MMF is designed to fluctuate in value, allowing the type of 
affiliate support currently permitted under rule 17a–9 would appear to be unnecessary”). 
205. SCOTT, supra note 104, at 224 ( “A floating NAV does not reduce the 
underlying risk of MMMF investments, including interest rate risk, credit risk and 
liquidity risk.  MMMF investors will continue to need ready access to their cash and have 
a low tolerance for risk.  During stress events, these risk-averse investors are still able to 
pull back quickly and are incentivized to do so.”). 
206. Id. at 224-25 (arguing that while investors have an incentive to redeem early 
from stable NAV funds, they also have an incentive to redeem early from a floating NAV 
fund to avoid further losses); see Fisch & Roiter, supra note 178, at 1036 (explaining that 
a stable NAV “is unlikely to forestall redemptions from an underperforming fund or a 
fund caught in the swirl of a credit market meltdown”). 
207. See Patrick E. McCabe et al., The Minimum Balance at Risk, supra note 177, 
at 1 (“Although either a floating NAV or a capital buffer could provide additional 
stability to MMFs, it is worth noting that investors in an MMF with a floating NAV 
would still face strong incentives to redeem shares quickly at the first sign of trouble—
before other redemptions deplete the fund’s most liquid assets . . . .”). 
208. See Qi Chen et al., Payoff Complementarities and Financial Fragility: 
Evidence From Mutual Fund Outflows, 97 J. FIN. ECON. 239, 258 (2010), available at 
http://www.columbia.edu/~wj2006/fund_run.pdf (finding that illiquid funds’ outflows are 
more sensitive to bad performance than outflows of liquid funds and arguing “that 
investors’ behavior is affected by the expected behavior of fellow investors [which] is a 
destabilizing force that generates outflows based on self-fulfilling beliefs”). 
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MMFs in Europe, found that whether or not a fund had a floating NAV 
had no statistically significant impact on redemptions from the fund.
209
 
A second problem cited by proponents is that the stable NAV 
misleads investors. Because the constant NAV enables MMFs to offer 
shareholders one dollar out for every one dollar in, some academics and 
regulators worry that investors—particularly retail investors—
inappropriately consider MMFs to be as safe as bank accounts, which are 
backed by federal deposit insurance.
210
 Proponents of transitioning to a 
floating net asset value regime—in which the NAVs of MMFs would 
fluctuate to reflect the mark-to-market NAV—argue that doing so would 
counteract the perception that MMFs are equivalent to bank accounts.
211
  
By sending a clear message to investors that MMFs are not equivalent to 
bank accounts, but are investments, the floating NAV would condition 
investors so that they would not run at the prospect of a MMF’s dropping 
in value.
212
 
Concerns over investors’ misperception of MMFs as bank accounts 
are likely overstated. MMFs clearly disclose the fact that they are not 
insured bank accounts in fund prospectuses.
213
 Almost two-thirds of 
 
209. See Gordan & Gandia, supra note 80, at 30 tbl.5a. 
210. See, e.g., Birdthistle, supra note 178, at 1187 (“A false sense of security is 
perhaps the single largest peril of money market funds today.  These funds convey an 
artificial impression that they are as safe as bank accounts . . . the chief culprit in 
propagating this impression is the fixed NAV, because it so closely resembles the fixed 
obligations of a bank account.”). 
211. See, e.g., Letter from Henry M. Paulson, Chairman, Paulson Inst., to Mary 
Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Feb. 22, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-619/4619-183.pdf (pointing out that a floating NAV 
regulatory regime could provide investors with “a tangible indication that they were not 
investing in a bank account”) (quoting HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK (2010)); 
Sheila Bair, Statement by the Systemic Risk Council on Money Market Fund Reform 
(July 19, 2012), available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/news_room_detail.aspx?id=85899406267 (arguing that, 
“[w]hile investors and savers view MMFs as equivalent to the safety of bank savings 
accounts, this stable value conceals the fact that significant investment and liquidity risk 
potentially exists in these instruments”). 
212. See, e.g., FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 174, at 69,466 (“A 
floating NAV would make gains and losses on MMF investments a regular occurrence.  
It would accustom investors to changes in the value of their MMF shares and reduce the 
perception that shareholders do not bear any risk of loss when they invest in an MMF.  
Such beliefs can make MMFs prone to runs if shareholders suddenly become concerned 
that they may bear losses.  Breaking the buck should no longer be a significant event 
because MMFs would simply fluctuate in value in the same manner as other mutual 
funds.”). 
213. 17 C.F.R. § 230.482(b)(4) (2013) (requiring that MMFs disclose the 
following: “An investment in the Fund is not insured . . . by the Federal Deposit 
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MMF assets are held by institutional investors such as wealth 
management firms or pension funds.
214
 Only one-fifth of MMF 
investments are in prime MMFs that are open to retail investors.
215
 
Institutional investors are sophisticated enough to understand that their 
investments are not guaranteed at one dollar and that sponsor support, 
even if it has been forthcoming in the past to maintain the stable NAV, 
might not be available in the future. According to a recent survey, three-
quarters of retail investors understand MMFs are not guaranteed by the 
government.
216
  In any case, retail customer confusion is not a legitimate 
basis for floating the NAV for institutional funds.
217
 
Regardless of the potential benefits, shifting to a floating NAV is 
not costless.  The tax, accounting, recordkeeping, and operational 
benefits of stable NAV funds would be compromised by moving to a 
floating NAV. Neither the FSOC nor the SEC offered concrete solutions 
for the tax problems associated with a floating NAV, but did suggest that 
the Treasury and IRS are working on those issues.
218
  Indeed, the IRS 
issued a proposal regarding the treatment of MMF share sales under the 
 
Insurance Corporation or any other government agency.  Although the Fund seeks to 
preserve the value of your investment at [one dollar] per share, it is possible to lose 
money by investing in the Fund.”). 
214. See Weekly Money Market Mutual Fund Assets, supra note 195 (finding that 
as of February 26, 2014, $1.76778 trillion of the $2.68363 trillion invested in MMFs are 
invested in institutional MMFs). 
215. Id. (finding that as of February 26, 2014, $523.46 billion of the $2.68363 
trillion invested in MMFs are invested in retail prime MMFs). 
216. See FID. INVS., THE INVESTOR’S PERSPECTIVE: WHAT INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS 
KNOW ABOUT THE RISKS OF MONEY MARKET MUTUAL FUNDS 3 (2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-619/4619-170.pdf. 
217. The SEC explained that “[t]he move to a floating NAV[, which is not 
applicable to retail funds,] would be designed to change the investment expectations and 
behavior of money market fund investors” and then cited a survey of retail investors 
about their understanding of MMF risk and availability of government assistance to show 
that MMFs’ expectations need to be changed.  SEC 2013 Money Market Fund Reform 
Proposal, supra note 181, at 36,874.  It is unclear how shifting institutional funds to a 
floating NAV and making related disclosure changes will assist retail investors in better 
understanding the risks of MMFs and the likelihood of government assistance. 
218. See SEC 2013 Money Market Fund Reform Proposal, supra note 181, at 
36,868 (reporting “that that the Treasury Department and the IRS are considering 
alternatives for modifying forms and guidance (1) to include net information reporting by 
the funds of realized gains and losses for sales of all mutual fund shares; and (2) to allow 
summary income tax reporting by shareholders”) (footnotes omitted); FSOC Proposed 
Recommendations, supra note 174, at 69,467 (reporting that Treasury and the Internal 
Revenue Service “will consider administrative relief for both shareholders and fund 
sponsors,” including ways to “simplify the measurement and reporting of gains and 
losses from floating-NAV MMFs”). 
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wash sales rule.
219
  MMFs and their shareholders could incur operational 
costs of adjusting to the floating NAV or—in the case of shareholders—
switching to other investments.
220
  The SEC attempted to lower the 
likelihood that investors would be forced out of MMFs into other cash 
equivalents by explaining that it: 
 
believes that an investment in a money market fund with 
a floating NAV would meet the definition of a “cash 
equivalent.” We believe the adoption of floating NAV 
alone would not preclude shareholders from classifying 
their investments in money market funds as cash 
equivalents because fluctuations in the amount of cash 
received upon redemption would likely be insignificant 
and would be consistent with the concept of a 
[“]known[“] amount of cash.221 
 
As the FSOC concedes, however, even the transition to a floating NAV 
regulatory regime “could create financial instability” and the “ultimate 
long-term reaction” to requiring MMFs to float the NAV is “difficult to 
predict with any precision.”222 
 
B. Capital Buffers 
 
A widely-discussed alternative to the floating NAV is requiring 
MMFs to establish capital buffers to supplement shareholder equity.  A 
capital buffer is a separate pool of cash or cash-like assets that is 
intended to shore up MMFs’ stable NAV.223 Proponents argue that an 
 
219. I.R.S. Notice 2013-48, supra note 191. 
220. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 178, at 171 (A “stable [one dollar] NAV provides 
convenience and simplicity to investors and managers alike, boosting MMFs’ efficiency 
with regard to tax, accounting, and recordkeeping.  Unlike other mutual funds, MMFs are 
used primarily as a cash management tool, which means that large transactions flow 
through them every day.  Without a stable NAV, many investors will bolt for other cash 
management entities offering a stable NAV in order to minimize tax, accounting, and 
recordkeeping burdens.”). 
221. SEC 2013 Money Market Fund Reform Proposal, supra note 181, at 36,869. 
222. FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 174, at 69,468. 
223. See, e.g., SQUAM LAKE GRP., supra note 178, at 4 (suggesting buffers as a way 
to “preserve[] the stable NAV structure but enhance[] its safety by requiring sponsors to 
establish contractually secure buffers that could absorb at least moderate investment 
losses to their money market fund investors” and comparing it  “to a capital requirement 
for stable-NAV funds”). 
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appropriately-sized capital buffer could curb runs: 
 
Because capital providers absorb the first loss, the more 
capital a MMF holds, the lower the chance that ordinary 
MMF investors suffer a loss, holding asset portfolio risk 
constant. In other words, capital reduces both the 
strategic motive for runs and the probability of panic-
based runs. Moreover, if an MMF has sustained a 
modest loss that has eroded some, but not all of its 
capital, an ordinary MMF shareholder is still protected 
by the remaining capital, and thus has less cause for 
concern—both that his shares will be impaired and that 
others will be concerned that their shares will be 
impaired. Thus, capital means that the threat of a run is 
less likely to become a self-fulfilling prophecy, in which 
investors strategically choose to run because they worry 
that others will run.
224
 
 
The FSOC included a capital buffer in two reform options that would 
preserve the stable NAV.  One option would combine a small risk-based 
capital buffer of up to one percent with a minimum balance at risk 
requirement.
225
  Another option would combine a risk-based capital 
buffer of three percent along with new diversification, disclosure, and 
liquidity requirements.
226
 In the first, the capital buffer would be 
“primarily designed to absorb day-to-day variations in the mark-to-
market value of MMFs’ portfolio holdings, and the [minimum balance at 
risk] serves as the primary tool to reduce investors’ incentive to redeem 
their shares when a fund encounters stress.”227  The capital buffer in the 
second alternative would “be significantly larger to provide greater 
capacity to absorb losses, lower the probability that a fund would fully 
deplete its buffer, and, accordingly, reduce the incentive of investors to 
 
224. Hanson et al., supra note 104, at 14-15. 
225. See FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 174, at 69,469-74 
(discussing NAV buffer plus minimum balance at risk alternative). 
226. See id. at 69,474-78 (discussing NAV buffer plus additional diversification, 
disclosure, and liquidity requirements alternative).  Because a three percent capital buffer 
requirement only applies to a portion of a MMF’s invested assets, a fund’s actual 
required buffer would be below three percent.  See id. at 69,474.  The FSOC estimated 
the actual size of a buffer for prime MMFs under its proposed rules to be 2.51 %.  Id. at 
69,474 n.111. 
227. Id. at 69,474. 
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run during times of stress.”228 Under both alternatives, each MMF would 
be responsible for the establishment of its own buffer. Others have 
encouraged the formation of a pooled, industry-wide buffer.
 229
 
As the FSOC recognizes in distinguishing its two proposals, an 
effective capital buffer would have to be quite large to prevent runs.
230
 
Even the larger of the two capital buffers proposed by the FSOC would 
have been insufficient to stop the Reserve Primary Fund from breaking 
the buck.
231
 A similar event could overwhelm a capital buffer in the 
future.
232
 
Even a small buffer could carry with it harmful unintended 
consequences and would be difficult to construct. As SEC Commissioner 
 
228. Id. 
229. Several commentators have supported public or quasi-private industry-wide 
buffer pools.  See, e.g., Jonathan W. Lim, Untangling the Money Market Fund Problem: 
A Public-Private Liquidity Fund Proposal, 19  STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 64-72 
(forthcoming 2014) (proposing a FDIC-like or publicly-administered liquidity pool 
backstopped by the Federal Reserve); Letter from Paul Schott Stevens, Pres. & CEO, Inv. 
Co. Inst., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exchange Comm’n (Jan. 10, 2011) 
[hereinafter Paul Schott Stevens letter to Elizabeth Murphy], available at 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-619/4619-49.pdf (supporting a private liquidity facility 
with access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window and for which prime MMF 
participation is mandated); BLACKROCK, VIEWPOINT, Money Market Fund Reform: 
Discussion of Reform Proposals 3 (Jan. 2011), available at 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-sg/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-mmf-
reform-discussion-of-proposals.pdf (supporting a privately-managed, industry-wide, 
pooled liquidity facility with access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window). 
230. It may not even be possible to design an effective buffer.  See, e.g., TUCKMAN, 
supra note 178, at 13 (arguing that it would be difficult to know how big a capital buffer 
should be given that MMF “portfolios suffer losses in value only in hard-to-quantify, 
extreme tail events”); McCabe et al., The Minimum Balance at Risk, supra note 177, at 
57 (noting that “investors would still have strong incentives to exit a fund if there is any 
danger that losses might exceed its buffer”). 
231. See SQUAM LAKE GRP., supra note 178, at 7 (explaining that “[i]n the two-day 
period following Lehman’s bankruptcy, the Reserve Primary Fund reported a minimum 
share price of [ninety-seven] cents “ and noting that a.  “buffer of at least $.03 per share 
would therefore have been necessary to prevent the Reserve Fund from breaking the 
buck”) (footnote omitted).  The FSOC estimated that the larger of its proposed buffers—
the risk-based buffer of up to three percent of NAV—would actually be “approximately 
2.51 percent for prime funds; 2.39 percent for tax-exempt funds; and 2.10 percent for 
government funds.”  See FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 174, at 69,474 
n.111. 
232. See id. at 69,475 (stating that “while the NAV buffer may reduce the 
probability that an MMF investor suffers losses, it is unlikely to be large enough to 
absorb all possible losses and may not be sufficient to prevent investors from redeeming 
when they expect possible losses in excess of the NAV buffer” and citing as an example 
that, as of September 30, 2012, “the largest average exposure in prime MMFs to a single 
firm, when aggregating all affiliates and weighting by fund assets, was 4.5 percent”). 
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Daniel Gallagher has noted, a buffer that is too small could do more 
harm than good as it “would. . . have given investors – especially retail 
investors, whom we are supposed to protect – a false sense of safety 
regarding their investments.”233  A small buffer, however, would serve 
another purpose noted by Commissioner Gallagher: 
 
It became clear to me early on in this process that the 
only real purpose for the proposed buffer was to serve as 
the price of entry into an emergency lending facility that 
the Federal Reserve could construct during any future 
crisis – in short, the “buffer” would provide additional 
collateral to facilitate a Fed bailout for troubled 
MMFs.
234
 
 
A solution that is grounded in an expectation of a future government 
bailout seems an unnecessary concession to the mistaken notion that 
MMFs cannot survive without a government backstop. 
A pooled, industry-wide buffer would necessitate this same 
concession.  An industry-wide buffer could be constructed as a public or 
quasi-private entity.
235
  Either way, proponents acknowledge that a 
Federal Reserve-funded backstop or access to the Fed’s discount window 
would be critical to a common pool’s success in stopping runs during 
crises.
236
 
 
233. Daniel M. Gallagher, Statement at SEC Open Meeting – Proposed Rules 
Regarding Money Market Funds (June 5, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171575594. 
234. Id. (citing Letter from Jeffrey N. Gordon, to Amias Gerety, Deputy Assistant 
Sec’y, Fin. Stability Oversight Council).  Gordon makes the point that changes to Federal 
Reserve Act § 13(3) would preclude lending facilities such as those used in the last crisis 
“in which the Federal Reserve lent against sketchy asset-backed commercial paper at 
par,” but MMF capital would give the Federal Reserve something against which it could 
lend.  Letter from Jeffrey N. Gordon to Amias Gerety, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Fin. 
Stability Oversight Council 9 (Feb. 28, 2013), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2012-0003-0131. 
235. Several commenters have supported public or quasi-private industry-wide 
buffer pools.  See, e.g., Jonathan W. Lim, supra note 229, at 64-72 (proposing a FDIC-
like or publicly-administered liquidity pool backstopped by the Federal Reserve); Paul 
Schott Stevens letter to Elizabeth Murphy, supra note 229 (supporting a private liquidity 
facility with access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window and for which prime MMF 
participation is mandated); BLACKROCK, supra note 229, at 3 (also supporting a 
privately-managed, industry-wide, pooled liquidity facility with access to the Federal 
Reserve’s discount window). 
236. See Lim, supra note 229, at 67 (explaining that a publically-managed industry-
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Regardless of whether it is pooled across industry or not, building a 
sufficiently sizable buffer to prevent runs would likely be prohibitively 
costly and would take too long.  According to the Investment Company 
Institute, the FSOC’s proposed risk-based three percent capital buffer 
would cost prime MMFs roughly $37.3 billion over six years.
237
  Another 
Investment Company Institute estimate finds that a three percent 
industry-wide capital buffer—including all MMF assets except U.S. 
Treasury securities—would require approximately $67.1 billion of 
capital to finance.
238
 
The difficulty of building a capital buffer would be aggravated by 
currently low MMF yields.
239
  The need to finance a buffer in a low-yield 
market environment could motivate prime MMFs to invest in higher-
yielding, and thus riskier, securities.
240
  Boards, shareholders, and 
advisers might feel comfortable with a higher-risk approach precisely 
because a buffer is in place.
241
  As experience during the last crisis 
suggests, the resulting higher-risk portfolios could fuel runs during times 
 
wide liquidity facility “[necessitates] a public backstop for any liquidity protection to be 
credible”); Paul Schott Stevens letter to Elizabeth Murphy, supra note 229, at 27 
(outlining reliance on the Federal Reserve’s as a critical component of a liquidity 
facility’s risk-limiting capabilities). 
237. See Paul Schott Stevens Letter to Amias Gerety, supra note 179, at 77 (2.51 
percent of $1.5 trillion in total net assets of prime funds as of January 2, 2013). 
238. SEAN S. COLLINS, INV. CO. INST., THE IMPLICATIONS OF CAPITAL BUFFER 
PROPOSALS FOR MONEY MARKET FUNDS 11 fig.5 (May 2012), available at 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_12_mmfs_capital_buffer.pdf. 
239. As of late February 2014, the average thirty-day yield for both Taxable and 
Tax-Free MMFs was 0.01%. iMoneyNet Money Fund Averages, IMONEYNET, 
http://www.imoneynet.com/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2014) [hereinafter IMONEYNET].  Some 
fund sponsors waive their fees during low-yield periods.  MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVS., 
2014 OUTLOOK – MONEY MARK FUNDS 2 (Dec. 12, 2013). 
240. See Letter from F. William McNabb III, to Amias Gerety, Deputy Assistant 
Sec’y, Fin. Stability Oversight Council, supra note 179, at 3 (arguing that MMFs might 
invest in riskier securities in order to compensate for the reduction in yields resulting 
from funding a capital buffer).  The FSOC’s approach, which would mandate a risk-
based capital buffer, could encourage MMFs to seek high-yielding assets that have a low-
risk weight, similar to the gaming that has occurred with the Basel capital requirements.  
See, e.g., Arnold Kling, Not What They Had in Mind: A History of Policies that Produced 
the Financial Crisis of 2008, MERCATUS CTR. GEORGE MASON UNIV. 23 (Sept. 2009) 
(“Recall that the Basel agreement created an effective [four] percent capital requirement 
(2 percent tier one or equity capital) for all mortgages, regardless of risk.  However, for 
mortgage securities guaranteed by Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae, the capital requirement 
would have been 1.6 percent (0.8 percent tier one).  Thus, it was capital-efficient to 
securitize mortgage loans with Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae.”). 
241. McCabe et al., The Minimum Balance at Risk,  supra note 177, at 6 (arguing 
that the presence of a capital buffer could “blunt MMF portfolio managers’ incentives for 
prudent risk management and investors’ incentives to monitor risks in their funds”). 
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of market stress.  As the FSOC acknowledged, the costs of establishing a 
buffer could “be passed on to MMF investors, in whole or in part, in the 
form of reduced yield.”242  The difficulties of building a buffer during a 
low-yield environment could be mitigated by requiring buffers be built 
up during high-yield periods, but this would further extend the time 
needed to build a meaningful buffer. 
Each of the several different ways to fund a capital buffer has 
problems.  A buffer could be financed through the retained earnings of 
MMFs, but this would take a lot of time.  According to the Investment 
Company Institute, an in-fund shareholder-financed capital buffer of just 
half a percent would take over five years to accumulate under best-case 
market conditions.
243
  An adjustment would have to be made to allow for 
the accumulation of a buffer without causing a MMF to break the buck 
on the upside.
244
  A fund’s ability to build up a shareholder-financed 
buffer would be slowed by a tax requirement that MMFs pay out at least 
ninety percent of annual earnings.
245
  Moreover, a shareholder-financed 
capital buffer could force MMF shareholders at the time a buffer is built 
up to subsidize future shareholders.
246
  SEC Chief Economist Craig M. 
Lewis finds that a buffer large enough to absorb more than day-to-day 
price fluctuations could “be a costly mechanism from the perspective of 
 
242. FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 174, at 69,475. 
243. COLLINS, supra note 238, at 27 fig.11 (“[b]est-[c]ase [c]onditions” constitute 
several operational and market assumptions, including that “expense ratios are .35 
percent and .40 percent, respectively, for the Treasury and prime fund,” that “investors 
reinvest [ninety] percent of distributed income,” that “commercial paper earns a yield of 
[twenty-five] basis points above that on [three]-month Treasury bills,” and that yields on 
three-month treasury bills rise to 3.75 percent in 2017 from 1 percent in 2013). 
244. Id. at 24 (noting that “a fund, under SEC rules and GAAP, can accumulate a 
capital buffer of no more than 0.5 percent of net assets” and “[t]he fund’s price per share 
(NAV) would remain fixed at $1.00 only until the fund’s mark-to-market value rises to 
$1.0050,” at which “point, the fund would have to adjust its NAV upward to $1.01, 
‘breaking the dollar’ on the upside”). 
245. Id.; see 26 U.S.C. § 852(a)(1) (2012) (requiring deduction for dividends to be 
ninety percent or more of fund’s income). 
246. EUR. FUND & ASSET MGMT. ASS’N, EFAMA’S RESPONSE TO IOSCO’S 
CONSULTATION ON MONEY MARKET FUND SYSTEMIC RISK ANALYSIS & REFORM OPTIONS 
18 (June 26, 2012), available at 
http://www.efama.org/Publications/Public/Money_Market_Funds/12-
4033_EFAMA%20Response%20to%20IOSCO%20Consultation%20on%20MMF%20%
28final%29.pdf (noting that “the cost would be borne by first generation investors to 
benefit of late generation investor,” which “is not consistent with basic principles of 
securities regulation”); FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 174, at 69,472 
(“[T]his may raise fairness concerns if MMF investors receive reduced yields in order to 
build a buffer that benefits subsequent investors.”). 
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the opportunity cost of capital.”247 
A buffer instead could be funded more quickly through 
subordinated debt or equity.
248
 The subordinated debt- or equity-holders, 
who could be third parties or the MMF’s sponsor, would serve as the 
fund’s first loss absorbers.  One advantage of this approach is its ability 
to constrain MMFs’ risk-taking by putting a price on it.249  However, the 
approach has several drawbacks.  First, it could simply create a trigger 
for runs by non-subordinated shareholders seeking to get out before the 
subordinated shares are exhausted.
250
  Second, it could be prohibitively 
expensive; third-party investors would likely demand generous returns in 
exchange for absorbing MMFs’ tail risk.251  Subordinated equity, which 
 
247. Craig M. Lewis, The Economic Implications of Money Market Fund Capital 
Buffers 35 (Working Paper, Nov. 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/workingpapers/rsfi-wp2014-01.pdf. 
248. See, e.g., Hanson et al., supra note 104, at 31-32 (outlining operation of 
subordinated share class); SEC, Unofficial Transcript: Roundtable on Money Market 
Funds and Systemic Risk (May 10, 2011) (statement of René M. Stulz), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/mmf-risk/mmf-risk-transcript-051011.htm (“We would 
have a senior tranche, which would be the money market fund, and then we would have a 
junior tranche, which would be -- which we call the equity tranche.  One way to 
implement that concept is that the fund could issue notes at regular intervals in the 
amount necessary to create the buffer.  For instance, they could have a six-month 
maturity.  The notes could promise a fixed interest payment or could receive the income 
in the fund in excess of some amount.  With fixed interest payments, the principal would 
be reduced if losses have to be paid. The notes could be issued through a bidding process 
or could be privately placed.”). 
249. See, e.g., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, supra note 197, at 16-17 (“The 
subordinated shares model provides capital shareholders an incentive to monitor a MMF 
for risk.  The option allows for the rational allocation of risk in that the subordinated 
shares would be allocated to investors seeking the possibility of higher returns in 
exchange for higher risk.  Also tail risk would be explicitly and transparently priced in 
the form of the preferential return paid out to the capital shares.”). 
250. See, e.g., Letter from Gregory P. Dulski, Corporate Counsel, Federated 
Investors, Inc., to Mohamed Ben Salem, Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns 23 (May 25, 2012), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-619/4619-190.pdf (“What the subordinated 
equity would provide, however, is a short ‘head start’ after the first loss announcement to 
put in a redemption request to get out ahead of other investors before the subordinated 
capital is exhausted.  This will make runs more likely, not less.”). 
251. According to an Investment Company Institute estimate, if fully-subordinated 
securities equaled three percent of a fund’s net asset value, then those subordinated 
investors would suffer an 8.3% loss in the event of a 0.25% loss of total fund assets.  
COLLINS, supra note 238, at 21; see Letter from Lu Ann Katz, Head of Global Liquidity, 
Invesco, to Amias Gerety, Fin. Stability Oversight Council, supra note 197, at 6-7 
(explaining that issuing “subordinated MMF interests” would likely entail investors’ 
demanding a rate of return between five to seven percent and thus requiring MMFs to 
earn 28 basis points annually—significantly less than what MMFs currently yield, while 
also explaining that based on the current size of the market for similar securities yielding 
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would not have a credit rating, could be more difficult to sell than 
subordinated debt.
252
  During times of market stress, however, it might be 
very difficult to roll over subordinated debt.
253
  Third, MMF boards and 
advisers would face the difficult task of balancing subordinated and non-
subordinated investors’ interests.254 
A sponsor could fund the capital buffer by purchasing subordinated 
shares or simply setting aside cash and cash-like assets.  According to the 
Investment Company Institute, even with high interest rates and fee 
revenues, MMFs would have to give up all fund advisers’ net earnings 
for at least sixteen years to finance a limited three percent capital buffer 
for assets other than Treasury securities and agency-issued securities.
255
  
A sponsor-funding approach could give larger sponsors a competitive 
advantage over their smaller rivals.
256
 
 
 
 
 
five to seven percent, it would be “difficult, if not impossible, for the high yield market to 
absorb” the volume of issuance necessary to accumulate a fifteen billion dollar, or one 
percent, NAV buffer across the industry). 
252. COLLINS, supra note 238, at 21 (“Capital markets experts indicated that the 
subordinated securities could be marketed to the institutional investors who are most 
likely to be willing to assume this kind of volatility (e.g., insurance companies, global 
reinsurers) only if the securities could obtain a credit rating, which would require them to 
be structured as debt.”); see INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, supra note 197, at 17 (noting 
that issuing equity is more costly than issuing debt). 
253. See COLLINS, supra note 238, at 23. 
254. See, e.g., BLACKROCK, VIEWPOINT, Money Market Funds: Potential Capital 
Solutions 7 (Aug. 2011),  
https://www2.blackrock.com/webcore/litService/search/getDocument.seam?contentId=11
11147384&Source=SEARCH&Venue=PUB_INS (noting possibility of conflicts, 
particularly if the adviser holds the subordinated securities). 
255. See COLLINS, supra note 238, at 17-19 & n.21 (assuming thirty-three percent 
of fees collected from MMFs go “directly to fund advisers’ bottom line,” all fee waivers 
now offered are removed, “short-term interest rates return to the rather elevated level of 
2006,” and money market fund expense ratios “double” to .40 from .21 in 2011). 
256. See, e.g., McCabe et al., The Minimum Balance at Risk, supra note 177, at 57 
(arguing that a capital requirement would be easier for larger firms to fund and thus could 
facilitate further industry consolidation).  As of September 30, 2012, the top five MMF 
sponsors managed forty-six percent of MMF assets.  FSOC Proposed Recommendations, 
supra note 174, at 69,462. In late February 2014, of the over 850 institutional MMFs and 
705 retail MMFs, the top 10 largest institutional MMFs by asset size held over twenty 
percent of institutional MMF assets and the top 10 largest retail MMFs by asset size held 
over forty percent of retail MMF assets (figures calculated by authors using data obtained 
from ICI and IMONEYNET).  See Weekly Money Market Mutual Fund Assets, supra note 
195; IMONEYNET, supra note 239. 
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C. Minimum-Balance-at-Risk 
 
Regardless of how it is funded, a capital buffer would give investors 
little incentive to shy away from risky funds.  Indeed, it could provide 
them the comfort they need to seek out risky MMFs.
257
 The minimum 
balance at risk (“MBR”) reform proposal offers a way to ensure that 
shareholders monitor funds’ risk-taking.  This approach is part of one of 
the FSOC’s proposed alternatives for reform and is based on a proposal 
by economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
258
  The 
proposal aims to dissuade MMF shareholders from redeeming in times of 
crisis by requiring that a portion of an investor’s total investments in a 
fund be “held back” for a specified period during which the hold-back 
amount would be available to absorb fund losses.
259
  The FSOC proposed 
a minimum balance at risk for non-government MMFs of three percent 
of the shareholder’s highest account value over $100,000 during the last 
thirty days and a hold-back period of thirty days.
260
  As proposed by the 
FSOC, shareholders’ minimum balance at risk would bear losses 
according to a subordination formula after the small capital buffer was 
exhausted, but only if the investor had made net redemptions of over 
$100,000 from the fund in the during that time.
261
 
The minimum balance at risk could force large shareholders—the 
ones most prone to run—to think carefully about their redemption 
decisions and thus could avert MMF runs.
262
 Early redeemers would pay 
a price for leaving early.
263
  As the description of the FSOC’s proposal 
 
257. See, e.g., McCabe et al., The Minimum Balance at Risk, supra note 177, at 56 
(arguing that a capital buffer, “by shielding MMF investors from losses . . . would shift 
the incentives for ensuring that MMF risks are well managed from MMF shareholders to 
the owners of the capital buffer”) (footnote omitted). 
258. See FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 174, at 69,469-74 
(describing proposal to combine small NAV buffer with minimum balance at risk); 
McCabe et al., The Minimum Balance at Risk, supra note 177. 
259. For a description of the proposal, see FSOC Proposed Recommendations, 
supra note 174, at 69,469; McCabe et al., The Minimum Balance at Risk, supra note 177, 
at 2-3. 
260. FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 174, at 69,470 (describing the 
minimum balance at risk proposal). 
261. Id. 
262. For a summary of these benefits, see McCabe et al., The Minimum Balance at 
Risk, supra note 177, at 3. 
263. Id. at 10 (stating that, “a sensible way to create a disincentive [to redeem] is by 
stipulating that redeeming investors absorb losses in such a fund before other investors . . 
. the MBR rules that we propose would cause some or all of a redeemer’s MBR to be 
subordinated relative to non‐ redeemers’ MBRs”); Schapiro, Statement on Money 
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illustrates, however, the minimum balance at risk would be very difficult 
for MMFs to implement and would leave investors uncertain about how 
much they could withdraw and when.
264
  The FSOC acknowledges, the 
“operational and technology costs . . . could be substantial” for MMFs 
and for institutional shareholders.
265
  Moreover, designing an effective 
minimum balance at risk would be difficult for regulators. 
The analysis by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York economists 
offers a window into the difficulty faced by regulators trying to design an 
effective minimum balance at risk regulation.  The authors look at 
different formulations and find that, combined with a 0.5 percent capital 
buffer, a minimum balance at risk of two percent might be adequate 
 
Market Fund Reform, supra note 175 (asserting that “remaining investors would not be 
harmed by a redeeming investor’s full withdrawal and the incentive to redeem fully and 
quickly at the first sign of trouble would be diminished”). 
264. For an example of how this would work in practice, see FSOC Proposed 
Recommendations, supra note 174, at 69,471 (“(a) An investor with a $200,000 MMF 
account and a $100,000 High Water Mark redeems $120,000.  The transaction is 
unaffected by the MBR requirement because the remaining balance of $80,000 exceeds 
the MBR of $3,000 (equal to 3 percent of the High Water Mark).  The transaction does, 
however, cause a portion of the investor's MBR to be placed in a subordinated, or first-
loss, position.  The portion of the MBR that would be subordinated is $619[;] (b) The 
investor closes the account the next day.  The investor receives $77,000, all of the 
Available Balance, immediately.  This represents the entire remaining account value of 
$80,000 less the $3,000 MBR.  The MBR shares will be redeemed after a 30-day delay.  
By closing the account, the investor causes its entire MBR to be subordinated for that 30-
day period.  However, the investor will receive the full $3,000 after the 30-day delay, 
unless the fund suffers losses in excess of its NAV buffer.”) (footnotes omitted).  One 
need only add a few more redemption or investment transactions to see how difficult this 
approach could be for MMFs and investors. 
265. Id. at 69,472-73; see Letter from Timothy W. Cameron & John Maurello, 
Managing Dirs., Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, to Amias Gerety, Deputy Assistant 
Sec’y, Fin. Stability Oversight Council 10 (Jan. 14, 2013),  available at 
https://www.sifma.org/comment-letters/2013/sifma-submits-comments-to-the-fsoc-on-
recommendations-for-money-market-fund-reform (reporting that SIFMA members 
anticipate that “reprogramming systems for an MBR would require at least a year of 
operational effort” and noting that some clients might successfully prevail upon brokers 
to use their resources to cover the held-back portion); Letter from Lynn Dudley, Senior 
Vice President, Policy, Am. Benefits Council, to Mary Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n 3 (June 19, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-619/4619-
204.pdf (arguing that ERISA plan recordkeepers holding MMFs in omnibus accounts are 
not equipped to handle holdback requirements and would have to incur substantial costs 
to modify systems in order to do so); Paul Schott Stevens Letter to Amias Gerety, supra 
note 179, at 73 (explaining that “to apply continuous redemption restrictions accurately 
and consistently across all investors in money market funds, [fund complexes, 
intermediaries, and service providers], including a host of intermediaries, would need to 
undertake intricate and expensive programming and other significant, costly system 
changes”). 
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under optimistic assumptions, but at least four percent would be needed 
to stop redemptions under more pessimistic assumptions.
266
  This 
analysis suggests that the FSOC’s proposal might not be adequate to 
stem runs. 
In addition to determining how high the minimum balance at risk 
should be, regulators would have to determine how long the holdback 
period should be.  A delay period that is too short would make MMFs 
more vulnerable to runs, but a long delay period would greatly 
inconvenience MMF investors.
267
 The FSOC proposed a thirty-day delay 
period, in part because “about half of MMF portfolio assets mature in 30 
days or less . . . .”268 
A one-size-fits-all holdback period would likely bring with it 
disproportionate costs.  An improperly calibrated minimum balance at 
risk could accelerate or precipitate a run.  Hanson, Scharfstein, and 
Sunderam, while generally favorably inclined towards the minimum 
balance at risk approach, note that it could “make funds more run-prone 
in bad times than a regime using a capital buffer.”269 Shareholders could 
redeem sooner than they would in the absence of the minimum balance at 
risk.
270
 Even during normal times, a minimum balance at risk would 
affect MMF shareholders adversely because it would interfere with 
normal redemption patterns.
271
  Industry surveys suggest that a minimum 
balance at risk requirement would significantly undermine MMFs’ 
usefulness.
272
  The day-to-day costs on MMFs and their shareholders do 
 
266. McCabe et al., The Minimum Balance at Risk, supra note 177, at 60.  For the 
details of their analysis, see id. at 60-77 (charts demonstrating loss scenarios under 
different assumptions). 
267. See id. at 40. 
268. FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 174, at 69,471. 
269. See, e.g., Hanson et al., supra note 104, at 27; see also Paul Schott Stevens 
Letter to Amias Gerety, supra note 179, at 71-72 (noting that “based on discussions with 
investors, our members have indicated that an MBR would increase a shareholder’s 
likelihood of redeeming during a financial crisis”). 
270. See, e.g., BLACKROCK, ViewPoint, Money Market Funds: The Debate 
Continues 4 (March 2012), 
https://www2.blackrock.com/webcore/litService/search/getDocument.seam?venue=PUB
_IND&source=GLOBAL&contentId=1111160117 (reporting that its clients told 
BlackRock that “with a portion of their balance held back for 30 days and subordinated, 
they would choose to redeem much sooner — at the slightest sign of nervousness in the 
markets”). 
271. See id. (reporting that forty-three percent of BlackRock’s institutional clients 
dropped below a three percent minimum account balance at least once in 2011 and ten 
percent did so more than five times a year). 
272. See TREASURY STRATEGIES, INC., supra note 189, at 17-19 (of 135 treasurers 
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not appear to be offset by a clear improvement in MMF stability. 
 
D. Triggered Liquidity Fees and Gates 
 
The minimum balance at risk proposal, like the capital buffer 
approach, places a high cost on MMFs and their shareholders during 
normal times even though they will only provide a benefit during very 
rare, tail events.  By contrast, the SEC proposed an alternative that would 
take effect only when warranted by circumstances.  Under this proposal, 
the SEC would require MMFs to impose a two percent liquidity fee if 
weekly liquid assets fell below a liquidity threshold of fifteen percent of 
total assets.
273
 It would also allow a MMF board to temporarily suspend 
investor redemptions—to “gate” the fund—if weekly liquid assets fell to 
the same trigger level and the board “determines that doing so is in the 
best interest of the fund.”274  Under this approach, MMFs would not have 
to float their NAVs, but the SEC would no longer permit the use of 
amortized cost accounting.
275
 
The SEC’s proposal gives the board a limited measure of discretion.  
The liquidity fee could be overridden or reduced if a majority of the 
board determines that the liquidity fee “would not be in the best interest 
of the fund or determines that a lower fee would be in the best interest of 
 
responding, ninety percent reported that they would decrease or stop using MMFs if a 
three percent subordinated holdback requirement were imposed); ASS’N OF FIN. PROF’LS, 
2012 AFP LIQUIDITY SURVEY: INTRODUCTION AND KEY FINDINGS 24 (2012), available at 
http://www.afponline.org/pub/pdf/2012_AFP_Liquidity_Survey.pdf (in survey asking 
about a ten percent holdback, forty-three percent of respondents said that their firms 
would stop using MMFs); see also Hearing Regarding Perspectives on Money Market 
Reforms Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 4 
(2012), available at 
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=
1fefa198-c629-48db-9f27-3be29f738606  (written statement of Nancy Kopp, State 
Treasurer, Md., on behalf of the Nat’l Ass’n of State Treasurers, arguing that a holdback 
requirement “could be especially problematic for smaller governments”); Letter from 
DST Systems, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exchange Comm’n 5 (Mar. 2, 
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-619/4619-128.pdf (arguing that a 
minimum balance at risk would make MMFs incompatible with sweep accounts). 
273. SEC 2013 Money Market Fund Reform Proposal, supra note 181, at 36,878 
(discussing proposed alternative). 
274. See id. (discussing proposed alternative). 
275. See id. (explaining that “rule 2a–7 would continue to permit money market 
funds to use the penny rounding method of pricing so long as the funds complied with the 
conditions of the rule, but would not permit use of the amortized cost method of 
valuation”). 
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the fund.”276  Boards would be permitted to suspend redemptions, but for 
no more than thirty days in any ninety day period.
277
  Fees and gates 
would be lifted once the level of weekly liquid assets reached thirty 
percent, unless the board lifted them before then.
278
 
The fees and gates proposal offers a number of potential benefits.  
The fees would provide much needed liquidity and support the NAV of 
the fund and thus help to mitigate the severity of redemptions.
279
 
Liquidity fees share with the minimum balance at risk approach the 
potential ability to discourage investors from redeeming during times of 
crisis and low fund liquidity.
280
 They both help to undercut the first-
mover advantage. Unlike the minimum balance at risk approach, MMFs 
and their shareholders would not need to alter their day-to-day practices 
during times of market calm because liquidity fees only go into effect 
during times of crisis.
281
 The cost of implementing a liquidity fee is 
likely to be lower than many other proposed reform options for MMFs.
282
  
 
276. See id. at 36, 883-84.  A majority of the board’s independent directors must 
also support removing the fee.  Id. 
277. See id. at 36,888. 
278. See id. at 36,884 (discussing operation of fees and gates). 
279. See id. at 36,880 (“To the extent that liquidity fees paid exceed such costs, 
they also can help increase the fund’s net asset value for remaining shareholders which 
would have a restorative effect if the fund has suffered a loss.”); see also Letter from 
Karla M. Rabusch, supra note 179, at 13 (explaining that “[t]he actions of those who 
choose to redeem in spite of the liquidity fee will help to support the fund’s market-based 
NAV and thus reduce or eliminate the potential harm associated with the timing of their 
redemptions to other remaining investors.”); 2013 Fidelity Letter to the SEC, supra note 
179, at 15 (“Investors that choose to remain in the fund during times when the 
redemption fee is in effect would benefit from the boost in NAV that the fund would gain 
from the fees paid by redeeming investors”). 
280. See SEC 2013 Money Market Fund Reform Proposal, supra note 181, at 
36,881 (explaining that “[t]he fees, once imposed, should both curtail the level of 
redemptions, and fees paid by those that do redeem should, at least partially, cover 
liquidity costs incurred by funds and may even potentially repair the NAV of any funds 
that have suffered losses”); see also Letter from Karla M. Rabusch, supra note 179, at 13 
(explaining that “liquidity fees would actually provide an affirmative reason for investors 
to avoid redeeming from a distressed fund.  That is, investors redeeming from a 
distressed fund will pay to exercise their right of redemption.  Those investors who do not 
need their money immediately, but who otherwise might redeem in reaction to market 
dislocation, will have an affirmative disincentive from doing so.”); 2013 Fidelity Letter to 
the SEC, supra note 179, at 15 (“The liquidity fee would serve as a premium on 
redemptions and, therefore, would discourage redemptions.”). 
281. See SEC 2013 Money Market Fund Reform Proposal, supra note 181, at 
36,879 & n.342 (citing relevant comment letters, stating “[u]nder normal market 
conditions, fund shareholders would continue to enjoy unfettered liquidity for money 
market fund shares.”). 
282. See, e.g., BLACKROCK, Regarding the IOSCO Consultation Report of April 
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MMFs and intermediaries, however, would have to incur the operational 
costs necessary to be prepared for the possibility that fees and gates 
would be imposed.
283
 
Triggered, pre-sized liquidity fees raise similar regulatory design 
concerns as those raised by the minimum balance at risk approach.  It is 
difficult to determine the appropriate trigger for fees and gates.  
Moreover, MMF shareholders could withdraw early in anticipation of a 
trigger being reached.
284
 Research shows that triggers in other contexts 
can inspire anticipatory trading volume.
285
  The SEC attempts to mitigate 
the concerns associated with predetermined triggers by allowing boards 
to decide not to implement a liquidity fee even if it the trigger is 
reached.
286
  A better approach—the one to which we turn next—affords 
boards open-ended discretion to gate. 
 
TABLE IV: Summary of Benefits and Drawbacks of MMF Reform 
Proposals 
Proposal Benefits Drawbacks 
Floating the 
NAV 
Diminishes the incentive 
to run from MMFs by 
reducing “first-mover 
advantage.” 
Does not prevent MMF runs 
and does not addresses the 
core issues driving them 
(liquidity, solvency, and risk 
 
2012: Money Market Fund Systemic Risk Analysis and Reform Options 10 (2012) (noting 
that “the cost of implementing standby fees is much lower than the cost of implementing 
other options”), available at 
https://www2.blackrock.com/webcore/litService/search/getDocument.seam?source=LITL
IST&contentId=1111165822&venue=PUB_INS. 
283. See, e.g., SEC 2013 Money Market Fund Reform Proposal, supra note 181, at 
36,892 (finding that each MMF could incur operational costs of $1.1 million to $2.2 
million to modify its systems to handle liquidity fees and gating). 
284. See, e.g., SCOTT, supra note 104, at 221 (arguing, based on experience with 
bank runs, that the prospect of redemption restrictions will accelerate a run); Letter from 
Gregory P. Dulski, Corporate Counsel, Federated Investors, to Mohamed Ben Salem, 
Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, supra note 250, at 32 (“Federated believes that liquidity fees, 
from the investors’ perspective, are simply a different way to break the dollar (and would 
be far more likely to occur than breaking a dollar based on NAV), and would generate 
large preemptive redemptions from MMFs.”); McCabe et al., The Minimum Balance at 
Risk, supra note 177, at 58-59 (arguing that sophisticated investors will monitor MMFs 
and redeem preemptively before gates or fees are triggered). 
285. See, e.g., SEC 2013 Money Market Fund Reform Proposal, supra note 181, at 
36,881 n.361 (citing literature finding that investors “trade ahead of predictable market 
closings and price limit hits”). 
286. Id. at 36,881 (noting that “the opportunity for preemptive redemptions will 
decrease as a result of the amount of discretion fund boards would have in imposing 
liquidity fees and gates . . . .”). 
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Serves as a reminder that 
MMFs are not equivalent 
to bank accounts  
of underlying investments). 
Necessitates costly tax, 
accounting, recordkeeping, 
and operational changes. 
Undermines the utility of 
MMFs by ending the $1-in-
$1-out characteristic that is 
of great practical value to 
investors. 
Doesn’t allow fund boards 
discretion. 
Capital 
Buffers 
Reduces the likelihood 
that a MMF will “break 
the buck” by absorbing 
losses and voluminous 
redemption requests. 
 
Neither halts MMF runs nor 
addresses the core issues 
driving them (liquidity, 
solvency, and risk of 
underlying investments). 
Requires at least a 3% buffer 
to be effective in times of 
crisis, which would be a 
prohibitively costly 
endeavor, particularly in a 
low-yield environment. 
A small buffer could give 
investors a false sense of 
security and the Fed a hook 
upon which to hang a future 
bailout. 
Doesn’t allow fund boards 
discretion. 
Minimum-
Balance-at-
Risk 
Diminishes the incentive 
to run from MMFs by 
making large redeemers 
pay for liquidity. 
Protects non-redeeming 
shareholders by creating a 
buffer. 
Encourages shareholders 
to monitor fund risk-
taking. 
Requires intricate regulator 
formulation of holdback 
periods and amounts, which 
if constructed improperly, 
could accelerate runs. 
Creates substantial 
operational and technology 
costs to track required 
holdbacks. 
Undermines MMFs’ day-to-
day utility by interfering 
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with the normal redemption 
process. 
Doesn’t allow fund boards 
discretion. 
Triggered 
Liquidity 
Fees & 
Gating 
Diminishes the incentive 
to run during crisis by 
making redeeming 
investors pay for liquidity. 
Protects non-redeeming 
shareholders by providing 
liquidity and supporting 
NAV 
Preserves the day-to-day 
usefulness of MMFs 
during normal times 
Requires regulator 
formulation of trigger 
which, if improperly 
structured, could accelerate 
runs. 
Causes anticipatory 
redemptions from a MMF as 
it approaches the trigger 
level 
Doesn’t allow fund boards 
sufficient discretion. 
 
VI. Voluntary Gating Proposal: A Risk-Pricing Approach to MMF 
Reform 
 
The proposals for further reform made by the SEC and the FSOC 
threaten to fundamentally change MMFs without making them 
fundamentally safer.  Enacting a reform that appears to address issues 
related to MMF redemptions, but fails to do so effectively, could lead to 
more serious harm than if nothing were done at all.  Our proposed 
approach does not make fundamental changes in the way that money 
market funds work on a day-to-day basis, yet offers MMF boards a 
flexible tool that fits neatly into their tried and true toolbox for 
addressing crisis situations when they occur.  Our proposal does temper 
the completely unfettered redeemability that has been a core feature of 
MMFs.  In doing so, it sends a message to MMF investors that in times 
of severe trouble, they may not be able to redeem.  It conveys this 
appropriately sobering message without imposing unnecessary costs on 
MMFs, their shareholders, or their sponsors. 
 
A. Description of Proposal 
 
We propose to allow all MMF boards of directors to halt 
redemptions (to gate) at any time and for any length of time without any 
conditions other than an affirmative board vote, including a vote of the 
majority of the fund’s disinterested directors, that suspending 
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redemptions is in the best interests of the fund and is necessary to protect 
the fund’s stable net asset value and to ensure the equitable treatment of 
fund shareholders.  A board’s gating decision would take effect at the 
beginning of the next business day and would end as soon as the board 
determined that the conditions necessitating gating were no longer were 
present.  Boards could not delegate this responsibility to the fund’s 
adviser or anyone else.  MMFs would be required to disclose the 
existence of the board’s authority to impose gates and, if gates were 
imposed, to inform fund shareholders promptly. 
In order to implement this proposal, the SEC could adopt a rule 
under section 22(e) of the Investment Company Act, which generally 
prohibits registered investment companies, including MMFs, from 
halting redemptions for more than seven days.
287
 As noted above, section 
22(e) allows limited restrictions on redeemability.
288
  The SEC’s existing 
rule 22e-3, which was adopted as part of the 2010 amendments, only 
permits MMFs to gate if they have voted to liquidate.  The SEC’s recent 
proposal would permit gating even if a MMF board had not decided to 
liquidate, but would impose triggering conditions on this authority.  A 
fund’s board could only gate if the fund had less than fifteen percent of 
its total assets in weekly liquid assets and only for thirty days unless the 
fund’s total weekly assets in liquid assets reaches thirty percent before 
that.
289
  Further, the board could gate for no more than thirty days in any 
ninety day period.
290
 
Under our proposal, a board would be free, subject to board 
determinations that gating is in the fund’s best interest and is necessary 
for the protection of the fund’s stable net asset value and the equitable 
treatment of fund shareholders, to impose gating when it deems 
necessary and for as long as it deems necessary.  The ability to gate 
would afford a fund time to act to avert runs before they imperil the fund 
and its remaining shareholders and to dispose of illiquid securities in an 
orderly manner in the event of market distress. Funds would need not 
resort to the sale of securities at fire-sale prices or the disposal of liquid 
assets to meet redemption requests. Boards would be able to prevent first 
movers from benefiting at the expense of a fund’s remaining 
shareholders. 
 
287. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 22(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (2012). 
288. Id. 
289. SEC 2013 Money Market Fund Reform Proposal, supra note 181, at 37,008 
(setting forth the text of proposed rule 2a-7(c)(2)(ii)). 
290. Id. 
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With the new freedom would come new responsibility. Because our 
proposal grants boards the constant, broad ability to gate without any 
government-mandated trigger, boards will have a responsibility to 
consistently and carefully monitor market conditions in order to 
determine when gating is in the best interest of their fund. 
As described earlier, state law, the Investment Company Act, and 
the rules under it—including rule 2a-7—already entrust boards with 
numerous responsibilities.  They are charged with exercising these 
responsibilities diligently and in the best interests of the fund.  Boards 
currently perform a variety of oversight functions for their funds.
291
  Our 
proposal would be a natural extension of these duties and would help 
directors to fulfill their role as fiduciaries to the fund.  Independent 
directors are given special leverage in making many of these decisions, 
and our proposal would do the same. 
 
B. Benefits of Proposal 
 
Our proposed approach to gating would align the incentives of the 
MMF’s shareholders, sponsors, and boards more effectively than the 
other proposals for further reform.  It would do so without the heavy 
costs associated with the other approaches. 
 
1.  Inspiring Informed Decision-Making 
 
First, it relies on boards to make fund-specific decisions based on 
current facts, rather than on regulators to make technically difficult, 
anticipatory, industry-wide decisions.  The board is uniquely positioned 
to assess relevant facts and circumstances in light of the high stakes for 
the future of the fund and its shareholders.
292
  In making the decision to 
 
291. See supra Table 1.  For responsibilities specific to MMF boards, see supra 
Table 2. 
292. See, e.g., Letter from Robert Sabatino, Managing Dir. & Head of US Taxable 
Money Markets & Keith A. Weller, Exec. Dir. & Senior Assoc. Gen. Counsel, UBS 
Global Asset Mgmt. (Americas), to Amias Gerety, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Fin. Stability 
Oversight Council 15 (Feb. 14, 2013) available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2012-0003-0109 (“We believe 
strongly that any triggering of liquidity fees or gates should be left to the discretion of a 
money fund’s board.  The circumstances under which a money fund may be called upon 
to impose liquidity fees or redemption gates may not be easily determinable beforehand.  
Rather than focusing on specific measures, the trigger should be a finding by the money 
fund’s board that the fund is experiencing circumstances that threaten the ability of the 
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gate, fund boards would be performing a function that is entirely 
consistent with their existing portfolio of responsibilities and their 
general oversight responsibility.
293
  The board’s existing legal duties of 
care and loyalty would ensure that they employ gating carefully.
294
 
By introducing liquidity risk, our proposal forces investors to 
choose their funds wisely.  The possibility that a fund will gate 
introduces a risk-reward trade-off presently not associated with high-
yielding, riskier MMFs like the Reserve Primary Fund. Higher yields 
would signal to investors increased liquidity risk. Shareholders would 
understand that riskier prime MMFs may be more at risk of gating—
which would result in liquidity costs for investors—in times of crisis. An 
analysis of hedge funds—which employ discretionary gating295—reveals 
that more stringent restrictions on redemption requests are correlated 
with higher fund yields.
296
 Introducing this trade-off to MMFs would 
mitigate the incentives of investors and funds to chase yields by forcing 
them to take into account the cost they might incur in terms of reduced 
liquidity.  The temptation to chase yields—as many investors appear to 
have done prior to the last crisis
297—would be tempered by the 
knowledge that the highest-yielding funds are also the most likely to 
gate.  To protect themselves, MMF investors would likely diversify 
 
fund to continue to maintain its dollar share price and/or the ability of the fund to pay the 
proceeds of redemptions.”). 
293. See, e.g., Clifford E. Kirsch & Bibb L. Strench, An Introduction to Mutual 
Funds, in FINANCIAL PRODUCT FUNDAMENTALS § 6:2.3 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 2011) 
(explaining that “[w]hile the Board may delegate certain oversight responsibilities to the 
investment adviser, the directors themselves retain overall responsibility for proper 
operation of the fund”). 
294. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
295. Unlike MMFs, hedge funds are not registered investment companies according 
to the Investment Company Act and therefore are not required to adhere to the 
prohibition on redemption restrictions established by section 22(e) of the Investment 
Company Act.  For more on the laws governing hedge funds, see generally Houman B. 
Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: Financial Innovation and Investor 
Protection, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 240 (2009). 
296. See George O. Aragon, Share Restrictions and Asset Pricing: Evidence from 
the Hedge Fund Industry, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 33, 56 (2007) (finding that the relationship 
between hedge fund returns and share restrictions is positive and that investors can 
“expect higher returns on funds with share restrictions, commensurate with the illiquidity 
they bear”). 
297. See Kacperczyk & Schnabl, How Safe Are MMFs?, supra note 44, at 1077 
(finding that “fund flows are highly responsive to current yields”); Baba et al., supra note 
67, at 71 (finding that in 2007 and 2008, “US money market funds continued to compete 
keenly under pressure from shareholders for yield” and did so in part by “extending the 
maturity of their portfolios”). 
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across multiple funds and increase their risk-monitoring. Investors might 
demand additional disclosures in order to facilitate their assessment of a 
fund’s level of risk. 
MMFs, in turn, would compete based on safety as well as on yield, 
because MMF investors care so much about access and liquidity.  An 
analysis of the effects of gating and other redemption restrictions on 
hedge funds reveals that gating negatively affected investors’ perceptions 
of funds that gated and their fund families.
298
  This is likely to be even 
more the case with respect to MMFs, which—in contrast to hedge 
funds—are expected to be liquid.  Advisers would take steps to protect 
their reputation.  Those steps could include sponsor support, which our 
proposal would not prohibit.
299
  Efforts to manage reputational risk 
would also likely include managing MMFs’ portfolio risk. Particularly if 
sponsor support decisions must be made public, advisers may prefer to 
emphasize ex ante portfolio risk management.
300
 In short, advisers would 
likely do everything in their power—including managing the MMF 
portfolio more cautiously and, when necessary, arranging sponsor 
support—to avoid a situation in which fund boards feel compelled to 
gate. 
 
2.  Preventing Runs 
 
Discretionary gating is a more effective way to stop runs than other 
proposals, because boards can react very quickly and deal with the 
problem directly.  Floating the NAV, capital buffers, imposing a 
minimum balance at risk, or charging liquidity fees have the potential to 
disincentivize runs, but discretionary gating could stop a run.  The halt in 
redemptions could, in turn, protect shareholders and prevent fire sales 
that spill into other markets.
301
 As Professor Hannam, who supports 
 
298. ADAM L. AIKEN, CHRISTOPHER P. CLIFFORD, & JESSE ELLIS, DISCRETIONARY 
LIQUIDITY: HEDGE FUNDS, SIDE POCKETS, AND GATES 27 (Working Paper 2012), available 
at http://www.financialrisksforum.com/risk2013/work/6024018.pdf (concluding that 
redemption restrictions “appear to have cast a shadow in the eyes of investors on hedge 
fund families that chose to restrict liquidity, hindering their ability to raise capital and 
leading them to reduce fees in the wake of the financial crisis”). 
299. Compare FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 174, at 69,466, 
which proposes to ban sponsor support. 
300. Baba et al., supra note 57, at 71 (“Support announcements in 2007 and early 
2008 acted as a drag on the growth of some fund families, with concern over risk 
management outweighing the reassurance of support.”). 
301. See, e.g., Gallagher & Paredes, supra note 176 (“Discretionary gating directly 
responds, we believe, to run risk, both as to an individual fund and across multiple funds, 
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either gates or liquidity fees, explains: 
 
[S]uspension of convertibility provides the best 
mitigation against a loss spiral in the event of a 
widespread run on banks and MMFs. If, as in September 
2008, MMFs experience unusually large redemption 
demands, which in turn would require significant sales 
of assets in falling markets, and there is a risk of a 
significant amplification of market distress, the best 
option for MMF sponsors, MMF investors and 
regulators is an orderly, industry-wide suspension of 
convertibility.
302
 
 
Gates would insulate MMFs from distressed markets, afford MMFs with 
time to re-establish liquidity, and prevent them from contributing to the 
fire sale dynamic.
303
 
Gates have worked to address runs in other sectors.  Economists 
Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz found that gates mitigated the 
severity of runs on U.S. commercial banks in the early 1900s.
304
 Gates 
 
as well as to the potential disparate treatment between retail and institutional investors.  
This should have the effect of addressing the conditions that gave rise to certain forms of 
governmental support in 2008, when money market funds had to sell portfolio assets to 
meet redemptions and scaled back their participation in short-term credit markets.”). 
302. Mark Hannam, Money Market Funds, Bank Runs and the First Mover 
Advantage 19 (Institutional Money Market Fund Ass’n, Working Paper 2013), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2187818. 
303. See, e.g., 2013 Fidelity Letter to the SEC, supra note 179, at 15 (“A gated fund 
would not need to sell assets into a distressed market, and thus would protect non-
redeeming shareholders from absorbing the associated liquidation losses.  Because the 
gated fund would not be forced to sell assets to meet redemptions, it would not be 
contributing to potential disruption of the short-term markets.  Moreover, as the fund 
builds liquidity by allowing its holdings to mature, it would act as a market stabilizing 
force by reinvesting the proceeds of its maturities over a horizon consistent with its 
targeted re-opening date.”); Letter from John D. Hawke on behalf of Federated Investors, 
to Amias Gerety, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Fin. Stability Oversight Council (Feb. 15, 
2013) (distinguishing liquidity fees from gates, explaining that “when a credit event 
occurs, the imposition of a voluntary gate will allow an MMF’s board to halt outflows, 
thus preventing a run while the board considers options for the protection of shareholders, 
and pointing out that a “voluntary gate would provide an MMF the necessary time to 
reestablish liquidity as short-term portfolio instruments reach maturity”), app. at 37-38, 
available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/mms-response/mmsresponse-35.pdf. 
304. See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY 
OF THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1960, 166-67 (1st paperback ed. 1971).  They determined 
that redemption restrictions protected the banking system, ensured that the failure of 
banks did not set off a chain reaction, provided distressed banks with the time to raise 
68http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/4
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also have been effective at preventing runs on hedge funds.  By 
December 2008, roughly 100 hedge funds had imposed restrictions on 
withdrawals.
305
 Professors Dai and Sundaresan argue that gates and 
similar mechanisms specified in hedge fund contracts help to “mitigate 
systemic risk when large-scale redemptions ensue due to unanticipated 
banking crisis or other macroeconomic developments.
306
 
 
3.  Ensuring Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
 
Fund boards are obligated to make decisions that are in the best 
interest of the fund.  A real concern with the current MMF regulatory 
structure is that first-movers are able to exploit MMFs’ constant net asset 
value to their advantage—redeeming from a fund at a time. Under our 
proposal, a MMF’s board of directors would be able to suspend 
redemptions in order to ensure that MMF shareholders are treated 
equitably.  Boards could undercut the first-mover advantage, pursuant to 
which early redeemers get out while the fund still has liquid assets and at 
a share price that is higher than the mark-to-market value of the fund’s 
underlying securities.
307
 The board could gate if certain investors were 
 
adequate liquidity, and “gave time for the immediate panic to wear off.”  See id. at 167. 
305. Kevin Hassett, Hedge Fund Roach Motels Might Just Be a Blessing, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 8, 2008), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=anXt996yzU6o.  This was 
nevertheless a difficult period for hedge funds.  See Shadab, supra note 296, at 290-95 
(discussing the experience of hedge funds during the financial crisis). 
306. JOHN DAI & SURESH SUNDARESAN, RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK FOR 
HEDGE FUNDS ROLE OF FUNDING AND REDEMPTION OPTIONS ON LEVERAGE 33 (2010), 
available at 
http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/ssundaresan/papers/Hedge_fund_leverage2.pdf.  
But see MELVYN TEO, HOW LIQUID ARE LIQUID HEDGE FUNDS? 34-35 (Research 
Collection BNP Paribas Hedge Fund Centre Paper 12, 2010), available at 
http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/bnp_research/12 (arguing that giving hedge funds the 
“option to raise gates may ironically encourage hedge funds to take on greater liquidity 
risk, and in so doing, exacerbate the asset-liability mismatch”) 
307. See Hannam, supra note 302, at 19 (explaining that “if all investors know and 
understand that the MMF sponsor would suspend convertibility if and when the fund can 
no longer provide liquidity to redeeming investors without disadvantaging non-
redeeming investors - i.e. no investor is disadvantaged by the actions of other investors - 
then the first mover advantage is removed”); see also Letter from Jonathan Curry et al., 
HSBC Global Asset Mgmt., to Amias Gerety, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Fin. Stability 
Oversight Council 18 (Feb. 15, 2013), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2012-0003-0111 (“In a period 
of heightened systemic risk, the ability of money market funds to suspend the standard 
terms under which shareholders are able to redeem fund units for cash, is the mechanism 
most likely to eradicate the possibility of a first mover advantage and thereby to reduce 
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engaged in strategic redemption designed to profit from a mismatch 
between the fund’s NAV and its shadow NAV. Likewise, the fund could 
gate if redemptions were depleting liquid assets too fast. A halt would 
allow the board time to sell assets in an orderly manner that would 
prevent one group of investors from profiting at the expense of others. 
Gating would ensure that institutional investors who tend to redeem early 
do not, by their actions, harm retail investors.
308
 This approach to 
protecting late-movers is a more blunt tool than a liquidity fee, but is 
easier to design than a liquidity fee, which—in order to be effective—
would have to vary with market conditions. Boards could be given the 
additional power to set calibrated liquidity fees. 
 
4.  Precluding Gaming 
 
Because there would be no pre-defined trigger under our proposal, it 
would be more difficult for fund shareholders to preemptively withdraw 
their funds than under an approach such as the SEC’s triggered gates and 
fees proposal or the FSOC’s minimum balance at risk proposal. Under 
our proposal, the board could close the gate effective at the beginning of 
the next business day.  If the board announced the gate at the end of the 
day, there would not be an opportunity for shareholders to get their 
redemption requests in under the wire.  By contrast, a pre-determined 
trigger invites advance redemptions.
309
 Gating by one fund could serve as 
a de facto trigger to prompt redemptions by shareholders of other funds.  
However, as the experience with runs in 2008 suggests, shareholders are 
able to discern among MMFs based on the content of their portfolios.  
Assessing fund portfolios should be even easier with enhanced public 
disclosure about fund portfolios. 
 
the risk of a run.”); Letter from Peter E. Madden, Chairman of the Indep. Trustees of the 
Federated Funds, to Amias Gerety, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Fin. Stability Oversight 
Council 2-3 (Feb. 13, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/mms-
response/mmsresponse-33.pdf (arguing that “a temporary suspension of redemptions 
could prevent unfair results such as redeeming shareholders being advantaged over 
remaining shareholders” in the event a MMF is facing a “potential run” or “other 
unforeseen circumstances”). 
308. See, e.g., Gallagher & Paredes, supra note 176 (arguing that gating could 
mitigate the “disparate treatment between retail and institutional investors”). 
309. See, e.g., Letter from Patricia A. Maleski, President, JPMorgan Mut. Funds, to 
Amias Gerety, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Fin. Stability Oversight Council 12 (Jan. 14, 
2013), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2012-0003-
0043 (“Any fund that is in jeopardy of breaching a trigger will likely see significant 
redemptions ahead of the actual trigger event.”). 
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5.  Ease of Implementation 
 
Unlike the other proposals, our proposal would not be costly to 
implement.  Although MMFs, their service providers, and intermediaries 
would have to be prepared in the event the board halts redemptions, 
those preparations would be much less extensive than shifting to a 
floating NAV or implementing procedures for liquidity fees or a 
minimum balance at risk.  It will likely not impose unnecessary costs on 
fund shareholders or fund sponsors.
310
 Our approach, therefore, does not 
give large funds an advantage over small ones, as some of the other 
proposals would. 
 
C. Potential Drawbacks of Proposal 
 
Although gating is the most effective way to prevent runs on money 
market funds without any unduly affecting the way MMFs operate on a 
regular basis, there are several drawbacks that are worth considering. 
 
1.  Conflicts When Directors Sit on Boards of Multiple Money 
Market Funds 
 
Directors often sit on the boards of multiple funds and thus may 
face conflicts of interest with respect to gating decisions.  For example, if 
the funds have overlapping portfolios, sales of securities by one fund can 
have a deleterious effect on the second fund.  The director who serves on 
the board of both funds may prefer to suspend redemptions of the first 
fund to protect the NAV of the second fund.  The questions of whether 
and when it is appropriate to sit on multiple boards is a broader question.  
Ultimately, however, board members have a fiduciary duty to each fund 
on the board of which they serve and may not weigh external interests 
when making decisions that impact a fund for which they sit on the 
board. 
 
 
 
 
310. See Paul Schott Stevens Letter to Amias Gerety, supra note 179, at 55-56 
(explaining that many of the processes necessary to enable gating at the end of a trading 
day already are in place, although some modifications would be necessary). 
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2.   Micro-Prudential Focus 
 
Another objection to the gating approach is that it is, at its core, 
micro-prudential.
311
  Our proposal could negatively affect MMFs’ 
purchasing share of the commercial paper market, a market in which 
MMFs are the largest purchasers.
312
 In the event of large-scale gating 
across MMFs in the event of a crisis, the commercial paper market—
especially for financial institutions—may be disrupted.  However, the 
responsibility of MMF boards is to their funds—not to financial 
companies that issue commercial paper, other fund counterparties, or the 
broader economy.  Our financial markets would be well-served if each 
financial institution paid close attention to its own risks, including its 
own tail risks.  Attempting to regulate MMFs in order to protect the 
commercial paper issuers that depend on them for funding is a very 
indirect way to address concerns about financial firms’ penchant for 
short-term financing.  If individual firms, including MMFs, focus on 
managing their own risks, the markets as a whole will be more stable. 
 
3.   Run Contagion 
 
Once one fund gates, there will be increased pressure on other 
MMFs to gate.  The ability of MMF boards to control their own gating, 
which is central to this proposal, arguably could be nullified by industry-
wide pressure to gate when other funds gate in order to avoid preemptive 
runs. Run contagion might force otherwise sound MMFs to gate.  During 
a crisis, industry-wide pressure to gate could be intensified because so 
 
311. See, e.g., Hanson et al., supra note 104, at 25 (“[G]ating rules have an 
inherently micro-prudential focus.  They are based on the condition of individual funds 
and aim to control the behavior of investors in individual funds.  However, gating rules 
can have significant macro-prudential consequences. Specifically, news that one MMF 
has initiated redemption restrictions could set off a system-wide run by panic-stricken 
investors who are anxious to redeem their shares before other funds also initiate 
restrictions.”). 
312. See Chernenko & Sunderam, supra note 86, at 10 (identifying MMFs as the 
“single largest holder of commercial paper in 2010” with thirty-seven percent of the 
market); Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Financial Accounts of the United 
States: Flow of Funds, Balance Sheets, and Integrated Macroeconomic Accounts, First 
Quarter 2013 92 (Fed. Reserve Statistical Release, June 2013), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1.pdf (finding that MMFs hold 
$351.1 billion of the $1.0012 trillion commercial paper outstanding in the first quarter of 
2013, more than any other purchaser). 
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many MMFs hold the same assets.
313
 Widespread gating across the MMF 
industry could increase the risk of contagion and not reduce it.
314
 Fearing 
this, shareholders might pull their money out of MMFs during turbulent 
times, regardless of the strength of their own fund’s portfolio. 
If a lot of money market funds gate simultaneously, markets could 
react quite negatively.  Mass gating is most likely to happen when many 
other bad things are also happening.  Just as we saw in the fall of 2008, 
the confluence of bad events made it very hard to pinpoint the source of 
the crisis.  Claims that the Reserve Primary Fund’s breaking of the buck 
was the sole catalyst for runs on other funds are likely overstated given 
the many other events happening that week, including Lehman’s 
bankruptcy and AIG’s bailout.  As discussed earlier, however, evidence 
from the crisis seems to indicate that investors were picking and 
choosing which funds to flee based on the quality and risk of those 
funds’ portfolios.315 
 
4.   Decreasing Attractiveness of Money Market Funds to Investors 
 
The possibility that a fund could gate—even though remote—could 
cause investors to leave MMFs. As with a change to a floating NAV, 
these outflows could be disruptive. This concern is somewhat offset by 
the fact that careless gating would damage a fund complex’s brand, so 
investors would have some assurance that gating will be only rarely 
employed.  A subset of investors will not want to take on even this 
remote risk.  In addition, some investors may find that any risk of 
redemption interruptions runs afoul of their investment guidelines. 
MMFs with open-ended gating also might not be appropriate investments 
for sweep accounts, 401(k) and other retirement plans, and other 
investors with strict liquidity guidelines.
316
 As with concerns about 
entities that rely on MMFs for funding, MMFs may not be the right 
investment vehicle for investors that demand absolute assurance of 
uninterrupted redemption.  To the extent our proposed approach causes 
these investors to look for alternate investments, it could be a positive 
 
313. See Letter from President Eric S. Rosengren et al. to Amias Gerety, Deputy 
Assistant Sec’y, Fin. Stability Oversight Council, supra note 200, at 7 (explaining that 
“[b]ecause many MMFs hold similar assets, one fund’s imposition of fees and gates 
could encourage runs on other non-gated funds”). 
314. See id. 
315. See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text. 
316. See Paul Schott Stevens Letter to Amias Gerety, supra note 179, at 57. 
73
  
1166 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  34:3 
step towards helping investors find appropriate investments for their 
needs. Nevertheless, the potential transition costs for these investors 
could be high as they search for alternate investment vehicles with less 
liquidity risk. Consequent MMF outflows could be disruptive to financial 
markets. 
 
5.   Inadequately Responsive Boards 
 
Boards might be overly hesitant to use their gating power.  Because 
gating will be extremely disruptive for investors, boards are likely to wait 
as long as they can to gate. Board delay would reduce the effectiveness 
of our proposal, one of the underlying strengths of which is its ability to 
be implemented quickly. The SEC worried that: 
 
a purely discretionary trigger creates the risk that a fund 
board may be reluctant to impose restrictions, even when 
they would benefit the fund and the short-term financing 
markets.  They may not impose such restrictions out of 
fear that doing so signals trouble for the individual fund 
or fund complex (and thus may incur significant 
business and reputational effects) or could incite 
redemptions in other money market funds in anticipation 
that fees may be imposed in those funds as well. Fully 
discretionary triggers also provide shareholders with 
little advance knowledge of when such a restriction 
might be triggered and fund boards could end up 
applying them in a very disparate manner.
317
 
 
Fund directors, however, are accountable to shareholders for their 
actions.  MMFs with incompetent boards might end up liquidating as a 
result of redemption pressures. Granted, the liquidation of a poorly-
managed MMF can impose market-wide costs. The ability of other funds 
to gate could help to stem those costs. Moreover, a poorly run fund’s 
liquidation would result in positive, long-term market discipline. MMFs 
that gate could lose assets to other funds with boards more willing to take 
action as needed. 
Boards of directors are, in the words of former SEC Chairman 
Arthur Levitt, “in an ideal position to monitor new developments and 
 
317. SEC 2013 Money Market Fund Reform Proposal, supra note 181, at 36,884. 
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trouble-shoot problems as they arise.”318  The possibility that some 
boards will not act quickly enough should not be a reason to deny 
discretionary gating as a tool to diligent boards, which the Investment 
Company Act and the SEC—by virtue of their heavy reliance on them—
presume most fund boards to be. 
 
VII.   Conclusion 
 
The events of 2008 demonstrated weaknesses in the MMF model 
and the unwillingness of the government to let the market exert its 
discipline. Accordingly, it is time to take another look at how MMFs can 
be made stronger.  Unfortunately, many of the suggested regulatory 
reforms for MMFs are operationally unfeasible and could unnecessarily 
deprive corporations, individuals, and institutional investors of a useful 
cash management tool. Worse, some proposals could exacerbate the 
chance or severity of another run on MMFs. 
On the other hand, our proposal to allow MMFs boards to 
discretionarily gate their funds would reduce the likelihood and the 
severity of runs while maintaining most of the desirable features of 
MMFs. By placing this key strategic decision in the hands of the board of 
directors, it builds naturally on the already extensive protective 
responsibilities Congress and the SEC have entrusted to fund boards. 
Discretionary gating could encourage prudent risk management by 
MMFs and careful investment decisions by shareholders. The liquidity 
risk associated with gating will cause investors and managers alike to 
think twice about yield-chasing. Gating will enable funds to avoid asset 
fire sales in times of crisis, which can harm funds. Our proposal equips 
fund boards with a powerful tool to ensure the equitable treatment of 
shareholders. It relies on the existing fiduciary responsibility of boards 
and on the unique insights of board members about how best to maintain 
the stability of individual funds. In doing so, our proposal offers a viable 
solution to make MMFs more resilient without undermining the useful 
role they play in the financial system. 
 
Authors’ Note: This article was written before the SEC’s summer 
2014 MMF reforms.
319
  In relevant part, these reforms require 
 
318. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before the Second 
Annual Symposium for Mutual Fund Trustees and Directors (Apr. 11, 1995), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1995/spch035.txt. 
319. Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. 47736 
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institutional, non-government MMFs to transition to a floating NAV and 
allow fund boards to impose liquidity fees and gates if regulatory 
thresholds are met.  SEC Commissioner Michael Piwowar, in voting 
against combining the floating NAV with fees and gates, explained that 
“the fees and gates approach would be the most effective at stopping runs 
on money market funds and would best preserve their benefits” and 
explained that he would have given “money market fund boards even 
more discretion in imposing gates.”320 
 
 
 
(Aug. 14, 2014). 
320. Michael S. Piwowar, Commissioner, SEC, Statement at Open Meeting 
Regarding Money Market Fund Reform (July 24, 2014), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1370542553721#.VA8sYPmzH-
s. 
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